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JAMES MADISON, CITIZENS UNITED, AND 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM OF 
CORRUPTION 
ANTHONY J. GAUGHAN* 
One of the most controversial decisions in the modern history of the Supreme 
Court is Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. In a 5–4 
ruling, the Supreme Court struck down the ban on corporate independent 
expenditures. The majority defined corruption in narrow terms and held that 
quid pro quo corruption was the only constitutionally permissible basis for 
campaign finance regulation. 
The decision set off a storm of outrage. President Obama even took the 
remarkable step of condemning the ruling during his State of the Union 
Address. Recent polls show that the public still overwhelmingly opposes the 
majority’s ruling in Citizens United. 
On the tenth anniversary of Citizens United, this Article puts the 
constitutional problem of corruption in historical context by examining the 
political career of James Madison. The Citizens United case turned on the 
First Amendment’s freedom of speech clause. Madison wrote the First 
Amendment while he served in Congress. He also played a key role in drafting 
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the Constitution and in authoring the Federalist Papers, which explained and 
defended the Constitution during the ratification debates. 
Nearly two centuries after his death, Madison looms as large as ever in 
American constitutional law. The Supreme Court still consults his writings 
and career for guidance in interpreting the Constitution. Madison’s appeal 
even transcends traditional divides, as justices across the ideological spectrum 
routinely cite him. 
The story of Madison’s political career thus brings a unique and important 
perspective to the Citizens United ruling. The underlying issues of free 
speech—as well as the threat of corruption posed by powerful financial interests—
were well-known to Madison. One of the most important constitutional theorists in 
history, he was also a career politician, serving as a four-term member of Congress 
and later as a two-term President of the United States. In addition, he helped 
Thomas Jefferson found the Democratic-Republican Party (known today as the 
Democratic Party), which meant that Madison spent his life not only as a public 
intellectual but also as a practical politician engaged in party building. Madison’s 
political experiences thus provide a revealing glimpse into how the First 
Amendment’s author approached the issue of money in politics when it came to 
his own election campaigns. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In January 2010, the United States Supreme Court decided the case 
of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.1 A 5–4 majority held in 
Citizens United that the government may not suppress political speech 
on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity.2 In striking down the 
 
 1. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 2. Id. at 365 (discussing § 441b (current version at 52 U.S.C. § 30118 (2012)) 
(“We return to the principle established in Buckley and Bellotti that the Government 
may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity. No 
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federal ban on the use of general corporate treasury funds for 
independent political expenditures,3 the majority identified the 
congressional goal of banning quid pro quo corruption as the only 
constitutionally permissible basis for campaign finance restrictions.4 
The Court further concluded that “independent expenditures, 
including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption 
or the appearance of corruption” because they do not involve 
coordination with candidates.5 Two months later in SpeechNOW.org v. 
Federal Election Commission,6 the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United, 
the Federal Election Commission (FEC) could not enforce 
contribution limits on independent expenditure groups.7 The era of 
the Super PAC was born.8 
 
sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or 
for-profit corporations.”). 
 3. Id. at 357 (“Limits on independent expenditures, such as § 441b, have a 
chilling effect extending well beyond the Government’s interest in preventing quid 
pro quo corruption. The anticorruption interest is not sufficient to displace the 
speech here in question. Indeed, 26 States do not restrict independent expenditures 
by for-profit corporations. The Government does not claim that these expenditures 
have corrupted the political process in those States.”). 
 4. Id. at 359 (citations omitted) (“When Buckley identified a sufficiently 
important governmental interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of 
corruption, that interest was limited to quid pro quo corruption . . . The fact that 
speakers may have influence over or access to elected officials does not mean that 
these officials are corrupt . . . .”); see also SpeechNOW.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 692 
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (“The Supreme Court has recognized only one interest sufficiently 
important to outweigh the First Amendment interests implicated by contributions for 
political speech: preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.”). The 
Supreme Court reinforced this conclusion four years later. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 
U.S. 185, 207 (2014) (plurality opinion) (“[W]hile preventing corruption or its 
appearance is a legitimate objective, Congress may target only a specific type of 
corruption—‘quid pro quo’ corruption.”). 
 5. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357. 
 6. 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 7. Id. at 692–93 (“[T]he government has no anti-corruption interest in limiting 
independent expenditures.”). 
 8. Richard L. Hasen, The Decade of Citizens United, SLATE (Dec. 19, 2019, 5:50 
AM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/12/citizens-united-devastating-impa 
ct-american-politics.html [https://perma.cc/U8WK-XZSH] (“After Citizens United, 
courts and the Federal Election Commission issued decisions that led to the creation 
of super PACs, political committees that spend money independent of candidates to 
promote or oppose candidates for office.”). On Super PACs, see Richard Briffault, 
Super PACs, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644 (2012). 
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The Citizens United ruling generated immediate controversy.9 Critics 
focused on the Supreme Court’s narrow definition of corruption, 
which limited campaign finance regulation to corrupt bargains 
between candidates and contributors (i.e., quid pro quo corruption).10 
Under Citizens United, Congress may limit the amount of direct 
contributions to candidates, but it may not restrict independent 
campaign expenditures that wealthy individuals or outside groups make 
without coordinating with candidates.11 Critics argued that the ruling 
effectively put many forms of corruption outside the scope of regulation, 
which in turn increased the influence of money in politics.12 A decade 
later, the controversy over Citizens United still roils American politics.13 
On the tenth anniversary of the Citizens United decision, this Article 
puts the constitutional problem of corruption in historical context by 
examining the political career of James Madison. The Citizens United 
case turned on the First Amendment’s freedom of speech clause.14 
Madison wrote the First Amendment while he served in Congress as a 
Representative from Virginia.15 He also played a key role in drafting the 
Constitution and in authoring the Federalist Papers, which explained and 
defended the Constitution during the ratification debates.16 
 
 9. See infra Part II. 
 10. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359. 
 11. See Hasen, supra note 8. Super PACs “can take unlimited donations from 
individuals, corporations, and labor unions. The legal rationale flowed directly from 
Citizens United: If independent spending cannot corrupt, then contributions to fund 
independent spending cannot corrupt either.” Id. 
 12. See id. (“The whole [concept] of Buckley and Citizens United is that 
independent spending cannot corrupt because there can be no coordination with 
candidates and therefore no opportunity for a quid pro quo. But in fact, thanks to 
porous FEC rules, candidates and supportive super PACs can legally do just about 
anything together, short of sitting down to plot a campaign advertising strategy.”). 
 13. For example, many Democratic presidential candidates in 2020 called for a 
constitutional amendment overturning Citizens United. See, e.g., Alexander Burns, Seven 
2020 Democrats Pledge to Focus First Bill on Fighting Corruption, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/29/us/politics/end-citizens-united-pledge.html. 
 14. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365. 
 15. IRVING BRANT, JAMES MADISON: FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1800, at 
255–65 (1950) (discussing Madison’s leading role in Congress and authorship of the 
Bill of Rights); see also N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 718–19 n.5 
(1971) (Black, J., concurring). 
 16. NOAH FELDMAN, THE THREE LIVES OF JAMES MADISON: GENIUS, PARTISAN, 
PRESIDENT xi (2017) (“Madison devised the Constitution. . . . Then Madison set out 
to convince the nation to ratify the constitution he had brought forth.”). 
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Nearly two centuries after his death, Madison looms as large as ever 
in American constitutional law. The Supreme Court still consults his 
writings and career for guidance in interpreting the Constitution.17 
Madison’s appeal even transcends traditional divides, as justices 
across the ideological spectrum routinely cite him.18 In the 2016 case 
of Evenwel v. Abbott,19 for instance, Justice Ginsburg cited Madison in 
the majority opinion,20 and both Justice Thomas21 and Justice Alito22 
cited Madison in their concurring opinions.23 The Court has also 
scrutinized specific incidents during Madison’s political career for 
evidence of how Americans interpreted the Constitution in the early 
national period.24 For example, in the 2019 partisan redistricting case 
 
 17. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 866 (2014) (quoting THE 
FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison)) (“As James Madison explained, the 
constitutional process in our ‘compound republic’ keeps power ‘divided between two 
distinct governments.’”); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006) 
(quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 430 (Max Farrand 
ed., 1966)) (“But before we do so, we must find that the question is presented in a 
‘case’ or ‘controversy’ that is, in James Madison’s words, ‘of a Judiciary Nature.’”). 
 18. See, e.g., Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016). 
 19. 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016). 
 20. Id. at 1127 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 54 (James Madison)) (“‘It is a 
fundamental principle of the proposed constitution,’ James Madison explained in 
the Federalist Papers, ‘that as the aggregate number of representatives allotted to the 
several states, is to be . . . founded on the aggregate number of inhabitants; so, the 
right of choosing this allotted number in each state, is to be exercised by such part of 
the inhabitants, as the state itself may designate.’”). 
 21. Id. at 1138 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James 
Madison)) (“Of particular concern for the Framers was the majority of people 
violating the property rights of the minority. Madison observed that ‘the most 
common and durable source of factions, has been the various and unequal 
distribution of property.’”). 
 22. Id. at 1146 (Alito, J., concurring) (“That interpretation is confirmed by James 
Madison’s summary of the same statement by Hamilton . . . .”). 
 23. Evenwel is far from unusual. See, e.g., Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion in 
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 
2672 (2015) (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 241 
(Max Farrand ed., 1966)) (“As Madison urged, without the Elections Clause, 
‘[w]henever the State Legislatures had a favorite measure to carry, they would take 
care so to mould their regulations as to favor the candidates they wished to 
succeed.’”), and Chief Justice Roberts’s dissenting opinion, id. at 2681 (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison)) (“As James Madison 
explained, the Senate would ‘derive its powers from the States,’ while the House 
would ‘derive its powers from the people of America.’”). 
 24. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). 
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of Rucho v. Common Cause,25 the majority put great weight on the fact 
that Patrick Henry attempted to gerrymander Madison out of a seat 
in the House of Representatives.26 
The story of Madison’s political career thus brings a unique and 
important perspective to the Citizens United ruling. The underlying 
issues of free speech—as well as the threat of corruption posed by 
powerful financial interests—were well-known to Madison.27 One of 
the most important constitutional theorists in history, he was also a 
career politician, serving as a four-term member of Congress and 
later as a two-term President of the United States.28 In addition, he 
helped Thomas Jefferson found the Democratic-Republican Party 
(known hereafter as the “Republican” Party),29 which meant Madison 
spent his life not only as a public intellectual but also as a practical 
politician engaged in party building.30 Madison’s political 
experiences thus provide a revealing glimpse into how the First 
Amendment’s author approached the issue of money in politics when 
it came to his own election campaigns. 
This Article reaches three principal conclusions. First, Madison 
began his career wary of the influence of money in politics, but he 
soon came to see campaign expenditures as essential to political 
communication.31 Second, Madison promoted his political agenda by 
building a network of partisan newspapers that served as propaganda 
 
 25. 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). 
 26. Id. at 2494. (“During the very first congressional elections, George 
Washington and his Federalist allies accused Patrick Henry of trying to gerrymander 
Virginia’s districts against their candidates—in particular James Madison, who 
ultimately prevailed over fellow future President James Monroe.”). 
 27. FELDMAN, supra note 16, at xii (“Madison denounced Hamilton’s plans as a 
blatantly unconstitutional attempt to shift power from the people to the capitalists.”); id. 
at 599 (“Madison showed no inclination whatever to punish antiwar beliefs or sentiments” 
because of his commitment to the First “amendment’s guarantee of free speech.”). 
 28. ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE PRESIDENCY OF JAMES MADISON 1–2 (1990). 
 29. NOBLE E. CUNNINGHAM, JR., THE JEFFERSONIAN REPUBLICANS: THE FORMATION 
OF PARTY ORGANIZATION, 1789–1801, at 88 (1957); JULES WITCOVER, PARTY OF THE 
PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF THE DEMOCRATS 26 (2003) (Jefferson’s Republican Party “came 
to be known, in turn, as the Democratic-Republican and finally, later, the Democratic 
Party. By some accounts, the original name ‘Republican’ was chosen out of sentiment 
for the French Republicans and their own revolution”); see also David Brown, 
Jeffersonian Ideology and the Second Party System, 62 THE HISTORIAN 17, 17–30 (1999). 
 30. FELDMAN, supra note 16, at xii (“With Jefferson, he formed the Republican 
Party to counter the Federalist Party.”). 
 31. See infra Part II. 
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vehicles; by creating a party organization that dramatically increased 
the cost of elections; and by welcoming the participation of wealthy 
campaign donors.32 Indeed, the expensive nature of American 
campaigns dates back to the electioneering tactics first developed by 
James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, and the party they founded. Third, 
Madison took an unusually broad view of the First Amendment right of 
freedom of expression.33 He believed that free speech rights should 
take precedence even when the government had compelling reasons 
to regulate or silence particular forms of speech.34 Moreover, the idea 
advanced by Citizens United’s critics that a special First Amendment 
protection exists for neutral, nonpartisan media organizations would 
have seemed alien to Madison since no such organizations existed at the 
time. In fact, he rejected the very idea of an independent press, 
pointedly noting that the newspapers of his day were heavily influenced 
by partisan as well as business considerations.35 Accordingly, during 
Madison’s presidency, freedom of expression applied universally and 
equally to all Americans, regardless of whether the speech emanated 
from the media or the general public.36 
There is of course no way of knowing with certainty how the author 
of the First Amendment would have viewed the Citizens United ruling. 
But the story of Madison’s political career reveals that he took a 
pragmatic approach toward money in politics and a strict approach 
toward free speech. Madison’s experiences as a candidate, party leader, 
and officeholder thus demonstrate that the majority’s reasoning in 
Citizens United has a much stronger constitutional foundation than the 
ruling’s critics would suggest. Money may not be speech, but Madison 
understood from personal experience that money is essential to effective 
political communication. The right to free speech does not mean much 
if the speaker lacks the means to disseminate the speech. The story of 
Madison’s career illustrates that point. In the process, it shows that 
money has played a crucial role in facilitating political 
communication as far back as the eighteenth century. 
 
 
 32. See infra Part III. 
 33. See infra Part IV. 
 34. FELDMAN, supra note 16, at xiii, 599. 
 35. Id. at 423. 
 36. See id. at 599 (“Madison showed no inclination whatever to punish antiwar 
beliefs or sentiments.”). 
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I.    THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM OF CORRUPTION 
The Citizens United case arose from a challenge to federal 
restrictions on political activity by corporations and unions.37 Prior to 
Citizens United, federal law barred the use of corporate and union 
general treasury funds for making “direct contributions to candidates 
or independent expenditures that expressly advocate the election or 
defeat of a candidate.”38 In addition, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
of 200239 (BCRA) extended the ban to include a prohibition on the use of 
corporate and union general treasury funds to pay for “any broadcast, 
cable, or satellite communication” that referred to a federal candidate 
within thirty days of a primary or sixty days of a general election.40 
A nonprofit corporation called Citizens United challenged the law by 
suing the Federal Election Commission in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia.41 The dispute arose from a ninety-minute 
documentary—Hillary: The Movie—that Citizens United produced to 
undermine Hillary Clinton’s campaign for the 2008 Democratic 
presidential nomination.42 Citizens United sought to air the documentary 
through video-on-demand services in the 30 days before the 2008 New 
Hampshire primary.43 However, the Federal Election Commission viewed 
the movie as an illegal corporate-funded independent expenditure.44 
Although most of Citizens United’s funds came from individual donors, a 
small amount of its financial support came from for-profit corporations.45 
Citizens United’s acceptance of donations from for-profit corporations 
thus disqualified it from engaging in electioneering communications.46 
 
 37. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 318–19 (2010). 
 38. Id. at 320. 
 39. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (current version at 52 U.S.C. § 30118 (2012)). 
 40. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 321. 
 41. Id. at 321–22. 
 42. Id. at 319 (“In January 2008, Citizens United released a film entitled Hillary: 
The Movie . . . It is a 90-minute documentary about then-Senator Hillary Clinton, who 
was a candidate in the Democratic Party’s 2008 Presidential primary elections.”). The 
film “depicts interviews with political commentators and other persons, most of them 
quite critical of Senator Clinton.” Id. at 320, 325 (“[T]here is little doubt that the 
thesis of the film is that she is unfit for the Presidency.”). 
 43. Id. at 321. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 319 (“Citizens United has an annual budget of about $12 million. Most 
of its funds are from donations by individuals; but, in addition, it accepts a small 
portion of its funds from for-profit corporations.”). 
 46. Id. at 327 (“Citizens United does not qualify for the MCFL exemption, however, 
since some funds used to make the movie were donations from for-profit corporations.”). 
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In a sharply divided 5–4 ruling, the Supreme Court sided with Citizens 
United.47 The majority held that the federal ban on the use of general 
treasury funds for independent expenditures made “political speech a 
crime.”48 In invalidating the ban, the Court emphasized that while the 
public might embrace or reject the contentions in Hillary: The Movie, the 
Constitution did not permit the government to criminalize the film’s 
broadcast.49 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy noted that “[t]he 
civic discourse belongs to the people, and the Government may not 
prescribe the means used to conduct it.”50 
The most controversial aspect of the Court’s opinion was its holding 
that corporations possess First Amendment rights like any other 
speaker.51 Justice Kennedy asserted that “[b]oth history and logic” 
indicated that the Constitution does not permit the Government to 
“impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers.”52 An unconstitutional 
effort to police speech struck the majority as the government’s true 
motivation in banning corporate election activity. “Speech restrictions 
based on the identity of the speaker,” Kennedy warned, “are all too often 
simply a means to control content.”53 The regulation’s practical 
implications particularly alarmed the majority. Justice Kennedy noted that 
BCRA’s electioneering regulations outlawed Sierra Club advertisements, 
National Rifle Association books, and American Civil Liberties Union 
websites if they referred to a federal candidate before an election.54 Such 
regulations, he warned, “are classic examples of censorship.”55 
The Citizens United court rejected the government’s assertion that 
the enormous financial power of corporations justified restrictions on 
 
 47. Id. at 372 (“The judgment of the District Court is reversed with respect to the 
constitutionality of 2 U.S.C. § 441b’s restrictions on corporate independent expenditures.”). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. (“Some members of the public might consider Hillary to be insightful and 
instructive; some might find it to be neither high art nor a fair discussion on how to 
set the Nation’s course; still others simply might suspend judgment on these points 
but decide to think more about issues and candidates. Those choices and 
assessments, however, are not for the Government to make.”). 
 50. Id. (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 341 (2003) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)). 
 51. Id. at 342 (“Under the rationale of these precedents, political speech does 
not lose First Amendment protection ‘simply because its source is a corporation.’” 
(quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978))). 
 52. Id. at 341. 
 53. Id. at 340. 
 54. Id. at 337. 
 55. Id. 
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corporate speech. Citizens United thus broke with a twenty-year-old 
precedent. In a 1990 case called Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of 
Commerce,56 the Court had upheld a state ban on independent corporate 
expenditures using general treasury funds.57 The Austin court warned of 
“the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations” of 
corporate wealth and held that “[c]orporate wealth can unfairly influence 
elections when it is deployed in the form of independent expenditures.”58 
But the Citizens United majority scornfully rejected Austin’s reasoning. 
The antidistortion rationale, the majority asserted, could “produce the 
dangerous, and unacceptable, consequence that Congress could ban 
political speech of media corporations.”59 Although federal law 
exempted media corporations from the corporate electioneering ban, 
Justice Kennedy warned that “the largest media corporations have 
‘immense aggregations of wealth,’” and “[t]hus, under the Government’s 
reasoning, wealthy media corporations could have their voices diminished 
to put them on par with other media entities.”60 The majority also did not 
believe that the exemption for media corporations made sense in the first 
place.61 The institutional press, Justice Kennedy insisted, does not have 
“any constitutional privilege beyond that of other speakers.”62 
Technological changes, such as the rise of the internet, made the 
distinction between the institutional press and other speakers untenable.63 
Equally fatal in the majority’s view was the fact that the government’s 
position would allow business corporations that owned media entities to 
exercise free speech rights that other corporations did not have.64 
As the majority saw it, “[t]he purpose and effect of this law is to 
prevent corporations, including small and nonprofit corporations, 
 
 56. 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 57. Id. at 668 (“Michigan identified as a serious danger the significant possibility 
that corporate political expenditures will undermine the integrity of the political 
process, and it has implemented a narrowly tailored solution to that problem.”). 
 58. Id. at 660. 
 59. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 351. 
 60. Id. at 351–52 (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660). 
 61. Id. at 352 (“The media exemption discloses further difficulties with the law 
now under consideration. There is no precedent supporting laws that attempt to 
distinguish between corporations which are deemed to be exempt as media 
corporations and those which are not.”). 
 62. Id. (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 691 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 63. Id. (“With the advent of the Internet and the decline of print and broadcast 
media, moreover, the line between the media and others who wish to comment on 
political and social issues becomes far more blurred.”). 
 64. Id. at 352–53. 
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from presenting both facts and opinions to the public.”65 The 
majority concluded, therefore, that the law’s regulation of corporate 
speech could not “be squared with the First Amendment.”66 
The Court’s defense of corporate political speech set off a storm of 
criticism. In a concurring opinion that dissented “emphatically”67 on 
the corporate speech issue, Justice Stevens insisted that in the past 
the Court had frequently “held that speech can be regulated 
differentially on account of the speaker’s identity.”68 Rejecting “the 
blanket rule that the majority espouses,” Stevens asserted that the 
Court’s precedents “recognize that the Government’s interests may 
be more or less compelling with respect to different classes of 
speakers, and that the constitutional rights of certain categories of 
speakers, in certain contexts, ‘are not automatically coextensive with 
the rights’ that are normally accorded to members of our society.”69 
The dissent saw no merit in the majority’s concern that a future 
Congress might attempt to ban speech by media corporations.70 In a 
footnote, Stevens observed that the “press might be able to claim 
special First Amendment status.”71 In any case, the real threat in his 
view came from unrestricted corporate political speech.72 In ominous 
terms, he warned that the majority’s “ruling threaten[ed] to 
undermine the integrity of elected institutions across the Nation.”73 
 
 65. Id. at 355. 
 66. Id. at 353. 
 67. Id. at 396 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 68. Id. at 420–22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Yet in a 
variety of contexts, we have held that speech can be regulated differentially on 
account of the speaker’s identity, when identity is understood in categorical or 
institutional terms. The Government routinely places special restrictions on the 
speech rights of students, prisoners, members of the Armed Forces, foreigners, and 
its own employees. When such restrictions are justified by a legitimate governmental 
interest, they do not necessarily raise constitutional problems.”). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 431 n.57. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 479 (“In a democratic society, the longstanding consensus on the need 
to limit corporate campaign spending should outweigh the wooden application of 
judge-made rules. . . . At bottom, the Court’s opinion is thus a rejection of the 
common sense of the American people, who have recognized a need to prevent 
corporations from undermining self-government since the founding. . . . While 
American democracy is imperfect, few outside the majority of this Court would have 
thought its flaws included a dearth of corporate money in politics.”). 
 73. Id. at 396. 
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The majority’s decision also generated extraordinary criticism from 
the other branches of government and the public at large. President 
Barack Obama condemned the decision during his 2010 State of the 
Union Address74 and later called for a constitutional amendment to 
overturn Citizens United.75 The ruling remains highly controversial. In 
the 2020 campaign, the Democratic presidential candidates almost 
universally condemned the Citizens United decision. For example, in 
supporting the call for a constitutional amendment to reverse Citizens 
United, Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders declared that he would 
make “clear that money is not speech and corporations are not 
people.”76 The public overwhelmingly agrees with Sanders’s 
sentiments. Public opinion surveys indicate Citizens United is one of 
the most unpopular rulings in modern history. For example, a 2018 
poll found that 75% of Americans support amending the 
Constitution to reverse Citizens United.77 The polling data reflected the 
widely held view that Citizens United represented a “hostile corporate 
takeover of our democratic process.”78 
Ironically, despite the fury over the corporate speech issue, the 
Citizens United ruling has only had a modest impact on corporate 
political spending. Ten years after the decision, relatively few 
corporations engage in electioneering communications, and the 
amounts barely move the needle.79 In fact, major corporations 
 
 74. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Gets a Rare Rebuke, in Front of a Nation, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 28, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/29/us/politics/29scotus.html. 
 75. Andrew Prokop, President Obama: I’d Love a Constitutional Amendment to Reverse 
Citizens United, VOX (Feb. 9, 2015, 11:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/2015/2/9/ 
7992489/obama-citizens-united-constitutional-amendment 
[https://perma.cc/4DHD-VYV7]. 
 76. Holly Otterbein, Sanders Unveils Plan to Stop Corporate Donations to Dem 
Convention, POLITICO (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.politico.com/news/2019/10/ 
07/bernie-sanders-corporate-donations-dnc-036157 [https://perma.cc/7ZX8-68DF]. 
 77. Ashley Balcerzak, Study: Most Americans Want to Kill ‘Citizens United’ with 
Constitutional Amendment, PRI (May 10, 2018), https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-05-
10/study-most-americans-want-kill-citizens-united-constitutional-amendment 
[https://perma.cc/6NE4-NZVA]. 
 78. Scott Castleton, It’s Time for Liberals to Get over Citizens United, VOX (May 7, 
2018, 9:10 AM) (quoting Congresswoman Rosa DeLauro), https://www.vox.com/ 
the-big-idea/2018/5/7/17325486/citizens-united-money-politics-dark-money-
vouchers-primaries [https://perma.cc/TAC8-849C]. 
 79. See Hasen, supra note 8 (“Looking at the amount of direct corporate spending in 
elections over the past decade, one might think that Citizens United was a bust. Few for-
profit corporations spend money in their own names boosting or dissing candidates.”). 
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accounted for less than 5% of independent spending in 2018, which 
itself only accounted for about 20% of total election spending.80 
Although it is possible that some corporations may be using 
nondisclosing 501(c) “dark money” groups to finance independent 
expenditures, the fact remains that candidates and parties still 
account for the lion’s share of campaign expenditures. 
Instead, what made Citizens United so important was the fact that it 
did not break new ground on a crucial issue: the constitutionally 
permissible grounds for campaign finance regulation. Like the 
majority in the landmark 1976 case, Buckley v. Valeo,81 the majority in 
Citizens United declined to recognize any governmental interest other 
than quid pro quo corruption—i.e., corrupt bargains between 
contributors and candidates—as a valid basis for regulation.82 In cases 
in the 1990s and 2000s, such as Austin, the Court had defined 
corruption in broad terms and acknowledged other potential 
constitutional justifications for regulation besides the anticorruption 
interest. For example, in the 2003 case of McConnell v. FEC,83 the 
Court recognized the Congressional goal of limiting donor access 
and influence as a constitutionally permissible basis for campaign 
finance regulation.84 But in Citizens United, Justice Kennedy rejected the 
regulatory rationales accepted by the Austin and McConnell courts and 
returned to Buckley’s single-minded focus on quid pro quo corruption.85 In 
overturning Austin and rejecting the antidistortion rationale,86 Justice 
Kennedy cited Buckley for the principle that the government has no 
constitutionally permissible interest “in equalizing the relative ability of 
 
 80. Karl Evers-Hillstrom, In Hyperpartisan Political Environment, Major Corporations 
Stay Away from Controversial Super PACs, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL. (Apr. 12, 2019), 
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2019/04/major-corporations-stay-away-from-
controversial-pacs20 [https://perma.cc/BF4J-XQ7Y]. 
 81. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 82. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010) (rejecting the other 
bases proffered by the government). 
 83. 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 84. Id. at 154 (2003) (“It was not unwarranted for Congress to conclude that the 
selling of access gives rise to the appearance of corruption. In sum, there is substantial 
evidence to support Congress’ determination that large soft-money contributions to 
national political parties give rise to corruption and the appearance of corruption.”). 
 85. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359 (“When Buckley identified a sufficiently 
important governmental interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of 
corruption, that interest was limited to quid pro quo corruption.”). 
 86. Id. at 365 (“Austin is overruled, so it provides no basis for allowing the 
Government to limit corporate independent expenditures.”). 
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individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections.”87 As 
Justice Kennedy emphasized, “[t]he First Amendment’s protections do 
not depend on the speaker’s ‘financial ability to engage in public 
discussion.’”88 Nor, in the majority’s view, did slowing “the skyrocketing 
cost of political campaigns” represent a constitutionally permissible basis 
for regulation.89 The Court emphasized that contributors’ special access 
and influence with officeholders was not sufficient to justify restrictions 
on independent expenditures. According to Justice Kennedy, “[t]he fact 
that speakers may have influence over or access to elected officials 
does not mean that these officials are corrupt.”90 
Citizens United thus left viable only one regulatory interest: the 
anticorruption interest.91 Moreover, by defining that interest narrowly 
and applying it exclusively to quid pro quo corruption, the Court left 
Congress and the FEC with very little regulatory room to maneuver.92 
As Justice Kennedy put it, “[t]he absence of prearrangement and 
coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not 
only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but 
also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro 
quo for improper commitments from the candidate.”93 
The Court thus concluded that the anticorruption interest was not 
sufficient to sustain the government’s ban on corporate independent 
expenditures because such expenditures did not involve coordination 
with candidates.94 As Justice Kennedy explained, “[l]imits on independent 
expenditures . . . have a chilling effect extending well beyond the 
Government’s interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption.”95 
The full ramifications of the Court’s decision became apparent two 
months later. Applying the logic of Citizens United, the D.C. Circuit 
barred the Federal Election Commission from imposing contribution 
limits on all outside groups—not just corporations—engaged in 
 
 87. Id. at 350 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976)). 
 88. Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49). 
 89. Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26). 
 90. Id. at 359. 
 91. Id. at 357. 
 92. Id. (“The anticorruption interest is not sufficient to displace the speech here 
in question.”). 
 93. Id. at 357 (Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47). 
 94. Id. (“[I]ndependent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do 
not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”). 
 95. Id. 
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independent expenditures.96 In SpeechNOW.org, the D.C. Circuit 
observed that “[t]he Supreme Court has recognized only one interest 
sufficiently important to outweigh the First Amendment interests 
implicated by contributions for political speech: preventing corruption 
or the appearance of corruption.”97 It further noted that in Citizens 
United the Supreme Court held that independent expenditures do not 
“lead to, or create the appearance of, quid pro quo corruption.”98 The 
D.C. Circuit thus concluded it had no option but to rule against the FEC 
because the plaintiff, SpeechNOW, an independent expenditure group, 
did not coordinate its activities with candidates.99 Writing for the circuit 
court, Judge Sentelle explained that “[g]iven this analysis from Citizens 
United, we must conclude that the government has no anti-corruption 
interest in limiting contributions to an independent expenditure 
group such as SpeechN[OW].”100 
In the years since Citizens United, Super PACs and other outside 
groups have spent at least $4.5 billion in state and federal elections.101 
Nearly $1 billion of that figure has been spent by 501(c) 
organizations that do not disclose their donors.102 Moreover, ten 
families alone accounted for over $1 billion in expenditures.103 Not 
 
 96. SpeechNOW.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 694 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“In light of the 
[Supreme] Court’s holding as a matter of law that independent expenditures do not 
corrupt or create the appearance of quid pro quo corruption, contributions to 
groups that make only independent expenditures also cannot corrupt or create the 
appearance of corruption.”). 
 97. Id. at 692. 
 98. Id. at 694 (quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360). 
 99. Id. at 689 (SpeechNOW “intends to operate exclusively through 
‘independent expenditures’”). The court elaborated: 
Given this precedent, the only interest we may evaluate to determine 
whether the government can justify contribution limits as applied to 
SpeechN[OW] is the government’s anticorruption interest. Because of the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Citizens United v. FEC, the analysis is 
straightforward. There, the Court held that the government has no anti-
corruption interest in limiting independent expenditures. 
Id. at 692–93. 
 100. Id. at 695. 
 101. Karl Evers-Hillstrom, More Money, Less Transparency: A Decade Under Citizens 
United, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL. (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.opensecrets.org/ 
news/reports/a-decade-under-citizens-united?utm_source=CRP+Mail+List&utm 
_campaign [https://perma.cc/6ERK-JLQ6]. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. (“The [ten] most generous donors and their spouses injected $1.2 billion 
into federal elections over the last decade.” (emphasis omitted)). 
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surprisingly, Citizens United has generated an enormous amount of 
scholarship, most of which is critical of the ruling, particularly of the 
majority’s narrow definition of corruption.104 The general public also 
rejects the Supreme Court’s definition of corruption. A 2018 Pew 
Research Center poll found that 77% of Americans support imposing 
caps on the amount individuals and groups can spend on 
campaigns.105 
But is the post-Citizens United era as different from past eras as one 
might think? A study of James Madison’s career suggests that the 
campaign finance world he operated in—and helped create—bore 
more similarities to our modern age than one might assume. 
II.    JAMES MADISON’S FIRST RACE 
James Madison was born in 1751 to a wealthy family in Orange 
County, Virginia.106 At the time of Madison’s birth, Virginia was a 
colony in the British Empire. Although Parliament exercised ultimate 
decision-making authority, the colonists nevertheless governed 
themselves relatively independently.107 Americans thus conducted 
elections throughout the colonial period. 
 
 104. For a small sampling of the academic literature on Citizens United, see 
generally RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED: CAMPAIGN MONEY, THE SUPREME 
COURT, AND THE DISTORTION OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS (2016); Richard Briffault, 
Corporations, Corruption, and Complexity: Campaign Finance After Citizens United, 20 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 643 (2011); Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the 
Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581 (2011); Michael S. Kang, The End of 
Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1 (2012); Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Deregulating 
Corruption, 13 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 471 (2019). 
 105. Bradley Jones, Most Americans Want to Limit Campaign Spending, Say Big Donors 
Have Greater Political Influence, PEW RES. CTR. (May 8, 2018), https://www.pew 
research.org/fact-tank/2018/05/08/most-americans-want-to-limit-campaign-spending-
say-big-donors-have-greater-political-influence [https://perma.cc/8RKV-9A9M]. 
 106. IRVING BRANT, THE FOURTH PRESIDENT: A LIFE OF JAMES MADISON 3 (1970); RALPH 
KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 6–7 (1971) (“He was of the substantial gentry, of 
the three or four hundred families that throughout his lifetime dominated Virginia 
politics and made such a large contribution to the public life of the new United States.”). 
 107. SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN 7 
(2005) (“The major claims on democracy’s behalf before the Revolution rested on 
the rising power, in many colonies, of the lower houses of the colonial 
legislatures . . . .”); W.L. Morton, The Local Executive in the British Empire 1763–1828, 78 
ENG. HIST. REV. 436, 436 (July 1963) (“The colonies of Great Britain were self-
governing from their foundation. As they grew in population and wealth their 
powers of self-government grew correspondingly, except as they were checked by 
royal instruction and parliamentary legislation. In time therefore colonial self-
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Surprisingly perhaps, money played a prominent role in colonial 
elections. Private wealth influenced eighteenth century elections in 
two ways. First, elected officials largely came from the upper ranks of 
society, and in some colonies wealth was even a formal prerequisite 
for office-holding.108 In South Carolina, for example, eligibility to 
serve in the colonial legislature required ownership of at least 500 
acres or ten slaves.109 Throughout the colonies, wealthy men of 
property saw office-holding as both a privilege and an obligation of 
their social class.110 As the historian Richard Beeman observed, the 
practice of limiting colonial office-holding to the rich was intended “to 
preserve the standing of the legislature as an exclusive body of men visibly 
recognizable for their wealth and social prestige.”111 The assumption that 
officeholders should come from privileged backgrounds persisted after 
the Revolution.112 The framers of the Constitution—including James 
Madison—hoped that the new Congress would be populated by the 
upper classes.113 They envisioned a leadership class made up of 
“gentlemen” educated at Harvard or Princeton and possessing “sufficient 
wealth and independence that they did not have to earn a living in too 
blatant or mercenary a fashion.”114 
But money also influenced eighteenth century politics in a more 
subtle way: the candidates’ practice of “treating” the electorate. Since 
the earliest days of colonial politics, American voters expected 
candidates for elective office to provide free alcohol at the polling 
 
government was bound to come into conflict with imperial control, as it did after the 
cession of Canada in 1763 in the clash of colonial and metropolitan legislative 
authority aroused by the Stamp Act.”). 
 108. WILENTZ, supra note 107, at 7 (“[T]he legislators were generally out of touch 
with their own constituents between elections, and ran their affairs much like the 
oligarchies that commanded the early eighteenth century House of Commons under 
Robert Walpole.”); see also RICHARD R. BEEMAN, THE VARIETIES OF POLITICAL 
EXPERIENCE IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 139 (2006). 
 109. BEEMAN, supra note 108, at 139. 
 110. WILENTZ, supra note 107, at 8; see GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 294 (1991) (noting that in the 1780s Americans finally began to abandon “the 
age-old tradition that public office was the responsibility of a leisured patriciate”). 
 111. BEEMAN, supra note 108, at 139. 
 112. WILENTZ, supra note 107, at 8 (“Dependent men were politically unreliable 
because they could be easily manipulated by their patrons.”). 
 113. Gordon S. Wood, Launching the Extended Republic: The Federalist Era, in 
LAUNCHING THE EXTENDED REPUBLIC: THE FEDERALIST ERA 1, 15 (Ronald Hoffman & 
Peter J. Albert eds., 1996). 
 114. Id. 
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places on Election Day.115 The practice continued for decades after 
the Revolution.116 By “treating” voters to vast quantities of beer, rum and 
whiskey, candidates demonstrated both their affluence and public-
spiritedness.117 As the historian W.J. Rorabaugh explained, “[t]he most 
important facet of treating was never the dispensing of strong drink, 
which was expected as a matter of course, but the manner and style of 
dispensing it. The candidate had to demonstrate his generosity and 
hospitality without a hint of stinginess or parsimony.”118 
The practice of providing the voters with free alcohol was such an 
entrenched feature of early American political life that candidates 
who declined to participate faced almost certain defeat.119 The early 
political career of George Washington was a case in point. In 1755, 
Washington mounted his first campaign for the Virginia House of 
Burgesses, the colonial legislature.120 But, in a sharp departure from 
custom and practice, he refused to incur the expense of treating the 
voters to free alcohol.121 The decision reflected his extremely stingy 
approach to money.122 Although the scion of a distinguished family, 
Washington grew up with little inheritance of his own.123 A deep 
sense of financial insecurity haunted him, which was only allayed 
when he married Martha Custis, the richest widow in Virginia.124 But 
that marriage remained four years in the future in 1755. As a young 
 
 115. FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 29–30 (tracing the roots of the American tradition 
from English politics); see W.J. RORABAUGH, THE ALCOHOLIC REPUBLIC: AN AMERICAN 
TRADITION 152 (1979) (“Another occasion when Americans drank was at elections, 
when candidates were expected to treat the public, voters and nonvoters alike. 
Treating at elections had been a colonial custom borrowed from England.”). 
 116. RORABAUGH, supra note 115, at 152 (“Such electoral practices did not change 
significantly after the Revolution.”). 
 117. FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 29–30; RORABAUGH, supra note 115, at 152, 154. 
 118. RORABAUGH, supra note 115, at 152. 
 119. Id. 
 120. RON CHERNOW, WASHINGTON: A LIFE 67 (2010) (“At the election in 
Winchester on December 10, 1755, Washington was crushed by his two 
opponents . . . .”); RORABAUGH, supra note 115, at 152. 
 121. RORABAUGH, supra note 115, at 152. 
 122. CHERNOW, supra note 120, at 107 (“Washington was congenitally prickly about 
money . . . .”); cf. RORABAUGH, supra note 115, at 152. 
 123. CHERNOW, supra note 120, at 18 (“The following year, when George was fifteen, his 
family underwent a period of extreme financial stringency that ended his education.”). 
 124. Id. at 79 (“By marrying Martha Dandridge Custis, Washington swiftly achieved 
the social advancement for which he had struggled in the military. . . . Marriage to 
Martha brought under his control a small kingdom of real estate . . . . She had a 
bountiful collection of properties . . . .”). 
2020] MADISON, CITIZENS UNITED, AND THE CONSTITUTION 1503 
 
and novice candidate with few personal assets of his own, he showed 
no interest in buying alcohol for voters.125 
The decision backfired on him. Washington went down to a 
surprising defeat in his first election,126 and he spent the next two 
years fighting in the French and Indian War.127 He would never make 
the same mistake again during his long political career. During the 
1758 elections for the House of Burgesses, he bought and distributed 
on Election Day 144 gallons of alcohol (some historians even place 
the amount at 160 gallons), including everything from rum to wine, 
an amount so generous he hoped it would persuade voters to forget 
his blunder three years before.128 As Washington explained in a letter 
to James Wood, his de facto campaign manager, “my only fear is that 
you spent with too sparing a hand.”129 
Washington need not have worried. The huge campaign 
expenditure worked wonders, just as he had hoped it would. He 
received over 300 votes, a tally sufficient to win the legislative seat.130 
As W.J. Rorabaugh pointed out, “[f]or his 144 gallons of refreshment 
he received 307 votes, a return on his investment of better than 2 
votes per gallon.”131 
Although the boozy spectacle of eighteenth century elections falls 
far short of romanticized versions of the country’s democratic origins, 
the candidates’ practice of “treating” the voters continued into the 
nineteenth century.132 Candidates who broke with the tradition did so 
at their peril, as James Madison would learn the hard way. 
In April 1777, less than a year after the Declaration of 
Independence, the Commonwealth of Virginia held its first 
republican elections.133 Madison looked like a shoo-in to win a seat in 
the new Virginia House of Delegates. A twenty-six-year-old Princeton 
graduate from a prominent local family, he already had experience in 
 
 125. RORABAUGH, supra note 115, at 152. 
 126. Id. 
 127. CHERNOW, supra note 120, at 69, 91 (stating that Washington entered the war 
in 1756 and resigned after taking Fort Duquesne in 1758). 
 128. Id. at 88; RORABAUGH, supra note 115, at 152. 
 129. RORABAUGH, supra note 115, at 152. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 29 (“The elections for the Virginia assembly in April 
1777 were the first republican elections in which Virginia’s citizens had ever participated.”). 
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public office.134 In 1776, he had served as a delegate to the state 
constitutional convention, where he made a mark as a thoughtful and 
devoted public servant.135 When Virginia held its first republican 
elections in 1777, Madison put his hat in the ring for a seat in the 
House of Delegates.136 
But there was just one problem: Madison refused to buy booze for 
the electorate, just like Washington twenty-two years before.137 The 
practice of wooing voters with alcohol struck young Madison as 
incompatible with republican principles.138 In his view, the 
“corrupting influence of spirituous liquors” undermined the integrity 
of American elections.139 As Madison saw it, voters should cast their 
ballots on the basis of the candidates’ personal qualities, not on the 
amount of their campaign expenditures. 
Despite the honorable nature of Madison’s decision, which was 
fully consistent with the theoretical underpinnings of republican 
ideology, his opposition to treating sunk his candidacy. Madison lost 
the election to Charles Porter, a local tavern owner whose occupation 
well-positioned him to meet voters’ Election Day expectations.140 
Thus, like Washington before him, Madison learned that voters 
expected candidates to spend money in seeking their votes. 
But also like Washington, Madison was a quick study. As Noah 
Feldman has pointed out, “[n]ever again would Madison fail to liquor 
up the voters when he ran for office.”141 Madison’s experience 
demonstrated the surprisingly expensive nature of politics during 
America’s founding era. By requiring candidates to incur significant 
financial costs to prove their commitment to the ordinary voter, the 
practice of treating the voters weeded out those who lacked the funds 
or inclination to make the customary expenditures.142 
Not surprisingly, therefore, in the eighteenth century the majority 
of officeholders came from the upper classes and thus could afford to 
 
 134. See id. at 6, 24, 28. 
 135. Id. at 24. 
 136. Id. at 28–29. 
 137. Id. at 29. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 30. 
 141. Id.; RORABAUGH, supra note 115, at 152. 
 142. See RORABAUGH, supra note 115, at 152–53 (noting it was “widely conceded” in 
eighteenth and nineteenth century American politics that “liquor elected 
incompetents and the lack of it defeated able men”). 
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buy alcohol in bulk for the electorate. The idea of government by 
independently wealthy officeholders was attractive because it meant 
they were beholden to no one and, in theory at least, served solely on 
behalf of the public interest.143 Accordingly, at the time of the 
Revolution, conventional wisdom held that politicians should not 
only pay for their own campaign expenses, but should also serve in 
office without pay.144 Washington himself exemplified the republican 
ideal of a self-sacrificing public servant.145 As commander-in-chief of 
the Continental Army, he refused to accept a salary.146 Washington’s 
contemporary Benjamin Franklin believed the republican ideal so 
important that at the Constitutional Convention in 1787 he proposed 
that executive branch officials should receive “no salary, stipend, Fee 
or reward whatsoever for their services.”147 
The democratization of American politics, however, rendered the old 
republican ideal of self-financing aristocratic officeholders obsolete even 
before the Constitution was adopted. As John Adams noted, if 
officeholders received no salary, “all offices would be monopolized by 
the rich, the poor and middling ranks would be excluded and an 
aristocratic despotism would immediately follow.”148 The delegates 
rejected Franklin’s proposal and the Constitution expressly authorized 
Congress to set compensation levels for federal officeholders.149 
As the historian Gordon Wood has explained, the defeat of such 
proposals signaled that Americans had begun the process of 
abandoning “the age-old tradition that public office was the 
responsibility of a leisured patriciate.”150 Indeed, upwardly mobile 
men from the “middling” classes increasingly won election to the 
 
 143. Wood, supra note 110, at 287 (describing how the rise of middle class 
officeholders during the early national period “undermined the two-thousand-year-
old classical tradition of aristocratic public service”). 
 144. Id. at 287 (“In an ideal republican world, government officeholders ought to 
serve without salary. Receiving profits from a public office smacked of interestedness 
and tainted the officeholder’s virtue.”). 
 145. See Garry Wills, CINCINNATUS: GEORGE WASHINGTON AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT 
3, 9, 185–86 (1984). 
 146. Wood, supra note 110, at 289. 
 147. Id. at 291. 
 148. Id. at 289. 
 149. Id. at 291–92. 
 150. Id. at 294. 
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state legislatures beginning in the 1780s.151 As Wood pointed out, “all 
levels of government were steadily being democratized and occupied 
by people with interests to promote.”152 
James Madison recognized that the democratization of American 
politics meant that new types of leaders would be elected. He did not 
entirely welcome the change. He privately expressed the fear that 
provincial local politicians would be elected to the First Congress.153 
To curb the populist instincts of the general public, he considered 
supporting a freehold suffrage requirement.154 But upon reflection 
he realized that the Constitution would not be approved if it was 
viewed solely as an instrument of political elites. Accordingly, in his 
public remarks, Madison embraced the democratic spirit of the age. 
In No. 39 of the Federalist Papers, he wrote that it was essential that the 
new government “be derived from the great body of the society, not 
from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it.”155 
As the new republic democratized, it also polarized. The 
ratification debates in the late 1780s and the partisan battles of the 
1790s gave rise to an epic political communications war. 
Communicating political messages over a large republic like the 
United States required money. As the country grew, and as ordinary 
people’s opinions and votes mattered like never before, campaign 
costs grew accordingly. Madison found himself forced to choose a 
pragmatic course. When he first ran for office in 1777, he feared that 
the use of money in elections—such as paying for the voters’ 
alcohol—corrupted republican values. But practical realities led him 





 151. Wood, supra note 113, at 15–16, 18 (“[P]roperty qualifications for 
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 152. Id. at 15. 
 153. Id. 
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 155. THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison). 
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III.    THE COST OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 
Like many Americans, James Madison feared that corrupt 
officeholders would undermine democracy.156 The success of the 
republic, he believed, depended on elected officials choosing to place 
the public interest ahead of their own private and factional interests.157 
During the Constitutional convention, he defined government 
corruption not only as bribery but also as government policies that 
promoted private ends at the expense of the public good.158 In 
Federalist No. 57, he stressed that the Constitution’s framers sought to 
promote the election of virtuous leaders who would “pursue, the 
common good of the society.”159 The Constitution, he added, was 
designed to establish “the most effectual precautions for keeping them 
virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust.”160 
Along with his fear of self-interested factions, Madison worried 
about the power of concentrated wealth.161 He opined, for example, 
that the “power of all corporations ought to be limited” such that 
they could not engage in “the indefinite accumulation of property.”162 
But he also proposed giving Congress the power to charter 
corporations during the Constitutional Convention in 1787.163 
Although his fellow delegates declined the idea, Madison’s proposal 
reflected his pragmatism. If corporations must exist, why not put 
them under the authority of Congress? 
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 158. Id. at 116 (“A good executive would have to be not only ‘separate’ from the 
other branches but also protected as much as possible from corruption, which meant 
to Madison not only dishonesty and intrigue but also, more fundamentally, pursuit of 
private (partial) over public (common) interest.”). 
 159. THE FEDERALIST No. 57 (Madison). 
 160. KETCHAM, supra note 156, at 117. 
 161. ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR 
CIVIL RIGHTS 4 (2018). 
 162. Id. at 4. 
 163. Id. at 3. 
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Madison’s pragmatism would become increasingly apparent during 
his meteoric rise as both a constitutional theorist and an ambitious 
politician. Although concentrated wealth alarmed republican thinkers 
like Madison, he needed the support of wealthy private individuals to 
circulate his ideas. In the end, therefore, the practical necessities of 
using money to fund his political campaigns proved more compelling to 
Madison than republican theories of political purity. 
The Federalist Papers provided an early example of how money 
proved essential to Madison’s political ambitions. In the months after 
the Constitutional Convention, Madison joined with Alexander 
Hamilton and John Jay in writing eighty-five essays in support of the 
Constitution’s ratification.164 Historians, legal scholars, and judges 
understandably and quite rightfully focus on the substance of the 
essays. The Federalist Papers have become a source that even the 
Supreme Court itself frequently consults to understand the intent of 
the Constitution’s framers.165 
But the Federalist Papers are important for another reason. They 
illustrate that the effort to sway public opinion in favor of the 
Constitution cost a significant amount of money. 
The first series of Federalist essays appeared in New York City 
newspapers in the fall of 1787 and early 1788.166 But Hamilton and 
Madison knew that the Constitution’s ratification depended on more 
than persuading readers in New York. It required the approval of 
ratifying conventions in nine of the original thirteen states.167 
Accordingly, Hamilton contracted with the publishers John and 
 
 164. Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Federalist Papers as a Source of the 
Original Meaning of the United States Constitution, 87 B.U. L. REV. 801, 802 (2007). 
Hamilton wrote fifty-one essays, Madison wrote twenty-nine essays, and Jay wrote five 
essays. See STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 102 (1993). 
 165. See, e.g., Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1127 (2016); N.L.R.B. v. Noel 
Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 523 (2014); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 
334, 362 (1995); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 806 (1995); 
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 539–40 (1969); see also RON CHERNOW, 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 260 (2004) (“By the year 2000, [the Federalist Papers] had been 
quoted no fewer than 291 times in Supreme Court opinions, with the frequency of 
citations rising with the years.”). 
 166. CHERNOW, supra note 165, at 246–47, 249; JOHN C. MILLER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 
AND THE GROWTH OF THE NEW NATION 188 (1959); Maggs, supra note 164, at 812. 
 167. U.S. CONST. art. VII (“The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, 
shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so 
ratifying the Same.”). 
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Archibald McLean to reprint the essays in a two-volume book.168 The 
McLeans ultimately published 500 copies of the two-volume set.169 
The publishers sent copies far beyond New York City, and Hamilton 
specifically directed that fifty copies be sent to Richmond before the 
vote of the Virginia ratifying convention.170 He and Madison also 
mailed copies to allies in Pennsylvania.171 
But the project resulted in enormous printing costs, far more than 
Hamilton or the publisher expected. The original contract between 
Hamilton and McLean called for the printing of twenty essays at the 
cost of 30 pounds.172 But Hamilton and Madison ended up writing 
over four times as many essays as anticipated, which meant that the 
printing costs eventually reached 220 pounds.173 Dismayed by the 
experience but still supportive of the Federalist cause, McLean 
ultimately charged Hamilton a fee of 144 pounds in all, with the 
publisher absorbing the remaining costs himself.174 It is unknown 
whether Madison paid Hamilton back for any portion of the 
publication costs, but it is possible that he did. He certainly could 
afford it. A member of one of the Virginia gentry’s most prominent 
families, Madison had a wealthy father and stood to inherit a large 
estate.175 Interestingly, according to Virginia state records, the day 
after publication of Madison’s last contribution to the Federalist Papers, 
he was overdrawn on his state salary and expense account by 100 
pounds.176 It is entirely possible that some of those expenses included 
his share of the Federalist Papers’ publication costs. 
 
 168. CHERNOW, supra note 165, at 248; Maggs, supra note 164, at 812–13. 
 169. Maggs, supra note 164, at 815. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 816. 
 172. CHERNOW, supra note 165, at 248; MILLER, supra note 166, at 192. 
 173. CHERNOW, supra note 165, at 248 (“The project’s magnitude mushroomed 
tremendously from its origins. . . . Instead of one projected volume of two hundred 
pages . . . The Federalist ended up running to two volumes of about six hundred pages. 
To worsen matters, the luckless printer was stuck with several hundred unsold copies 
and grumbled that he didn’t clear five pounds on the whole deal.”); MILLER, supra 
note 166, at 192. 
 174. See Letter from Archibald McLean to Robert Troup (Oct. 11, 1788), in THE INTIMATE 
LIFE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 82 (Allan McLane Hamilton ed., 1910) (“The money expended 
for Printing, Paper, Journeyman’s Wages and Binding was upwards of two hundred and twenty 
Pounds; of which sum I have charged Col. Hamilton with 144 pounds.”). 
 175. FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 394; KETCHAM, supra note 106, at 6–7. 
 176. BRANT, supra note 15, at 185 (“Madison’s service in the Continental Congress 
came to a close when he set out for home on March 4, 1788, the day after his final 
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In any case, the total expenses incurred in the publication of the 
Federalist Papers far exceeded the ability of a person of ordinary means to 
pay. Although 220 pounds may not seem like a large amount, it was a 
considerable sum for the 1780s. By way of comparison, the annual rent for 
Madison’s Philadelphia home was 200 pounds.177 In modern terms, the 
Federalist Papers certainly cost many thousands of dollars to publish. The 
precise conversion to modern dollars depends on the currency Hamilton 
and McLean used. The reference to “pounds” may mean British pounds, 
which remained in circulation for years after the Revolutionary War. If 
that was the case, 220 British pounds in 1787 translates to about $36,604 
in 2020.178 To be sure, that figure must be used with caution. The 
eighteenth century American currency system was “a highly confusing” 
combination of English currency, foreign coins (especially Spanish and 
Portuguese), and American money.179 The states, including Pennsylvania, 
sometimes referred to their local currency as “pounds.”180 In any case, in 
his writings in the 1780s, Hamilton referred to his possession of “pounds 
sterling,” a common term for the British pound.181 For example, in a letter 
to his brother in June 1785, Hamilton promised to send fifty “pounds 
sterling” to relieve his brother’s financial distress.182 
 
Federalist article was published. He was then, an audit showed, overdrawn £100 for 
salary and expenses, which he refunded to the state.”). 
 177. Roland M. Baumann, John Swanwick: Spokesman for “Merchant-Republicanism” in 
Philadelphia, 1790–1798, 97 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 131, 168 n.172 (1973) 
(“Swanwick secured for the Madisons a three-story brick house in Philadelphia for a 
yearly rent of £200.”). 
 178. For the conversion of historical British pounds to modern U.S. dollars, see 
Eric W. Nye, Pounds Sterling to Dollars: Historical Conversion of Currency, UNIV. OF WYO., 
https://www.uwyo.edu/numimage/currency.htm [https://perma.cc/G6HD-CYAR]. 
 179. EDWIN J. PERKINS, AMERICAN PUBLIC FINANCE AND FINANCIAL SERVICES, 1700–
1815, at 25–26 (1994). 
 180. Farley Grubb, Creating the U.S. Dollar Currency Union, 1748–1811: A Quest for 
Monetary Stability or a Usurpation of State Sovereignty for Personal Gain?, 93 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1778, 1783, 1787 (2003); Ronald W. Michener and Robert E. Wright, State 
“Currencies” and the Transition to the U.S. Dollar: Clarifying Some Confusions, 95 AM. 
ECON. REV. 682, 685 (2005) (“We contend that the ‘Pennsylvania pounds’ mentioned 
in these records do not refer specifically to Pennsylvania bills of credit. . . . Media of 
exchange were usually not denominated in pounds and included such diverse means 
of payment as country produce; foreign coins such as Spanish dollars, pistareens, or 
guineas; paper money; book account transfers; or a combination thereof.”). 
 181. Joseph Albert Ernst, MONEY AND POLITICS IN AMERICA, 1755–1775, at xviii (1973) 
(“Pounds sterling would be the value of anything stated in terms of English sterling.”). 
 182. Alexander Hamilton to James Hamilton, 22 June 1785, NAT’L ARCHIVES, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-03-02-0444 
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But whatever the precise amount that the 220 pounds converts to 
in modern terms, not many people—then or now—could afford the 
expense of publishing the Federalist Papers. Hamilton’s bank account 
(and perhaps Madison’s too)183—combined with the publisher’s 
willingness to bear a significant share of the costs—made it possible 
for the Federalist Papers to reach readers during the critical months of 
the ratification debate. Would the public have been better served if 
privileged individuals like Hamilton and Madison had refrained from 
using their personal financial resources to broadcast their political 
message? It seems hard to see how the answer could be yes, especially in 
light of the widespread veneration of the Federalist Papers today. The fact 
that the authors possessed far more wealth than the general population—
and thus had a larger platform on which to speak—did not make the 
sentiments they expressed any less valuable. As the Supreme Court 
emphasized in Citizens United, “[t]he rule that political speech cannot be 
limited based on a speaker’s wealth is a necessary consequence of the 
premise that the First Amendment generally prohibits the suppression of 
political speech based on the speaker’s identity.”184 
The Federalist Papers provided a microcosm of the role of money in 
the broader battle for public opinion during the ratification debate. 
The battle pitted the proratification Federalists against the 
Constitution’s opponents, known collectively as the Anti-Federalists.185 
The Federalists, of course, ultimately prevailed. One reason why was 
because they possessed a crucial communications advantage: they and 
 
[https://perma.cc/ZE65-N6SC] (“The situation you describe yourself to be in gives me 
much pain, and nothing will make me happier than, as far as may be in my power, to 
contribute to your relief. I will cheerfully pay your draft upon me for fifty pounds sterling, 
whenever it shall appear. I wish it was in my power to desire you to enlarge the sum; but 
though my future prospects are of the most flattering kind my present engagements 
would render it inconvenient to me to advance you a larger sum.”). 
 183. Hamilton was also willing to go into debt on behalf of public service. See 
CHERNOW, supra note 165, at 483 (“The plain truth was that Hamilton was indebted 
and needed money badly. . . . If Hamilton had a vice, it was clearly a craving for 
power, not money, and he left public office much poorer than he entered it.”). 
 184. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 350 (2010). 
 185. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 134 (1996) (“One irony of ratification was that both sides had to 
appeal to a public opinion in which they placed little confidence”); CLINTON 
ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 278–79 (1987) (explaining that the 
Federalists supported ratification and the Anti-Federalists opposed it); STORING, supra 
note 154, at 5 (“The Anti-Federalists were primarily against the Constitution”). 
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their allies owned most of the newspapers in the late 1780s.186 Far from 
an “impartial medium,” newspapers played a critical role by actively 
promoting the ratification cause.187 In fact, only twelve out of the 
nation’s 100 newspapers supported the Anti-Federalists.188 Business 
considerations played a significant role in the lopsided coverage. 
Newspaper editors feared offending the powerful merchant class, 
which supported the Federalists.189 As James Madison himself would 
later note, newspaper publishers depended on the advertising 
revenues that they generated from merchants.190 Making their pages 
available to the Anti-Federalists posed a financial risk that few 
newspaper owners or editors could afford.191 The financial influence 
of the merchant class thus gave the Federalists a significant advantage 
in the communications war with the Anti-Federalists. 
The Federalist advantage in the dissemination of information was 
not the primary reason the Constitution was ultimately adopted.192 
The most important asset the Federalists possessed was the fact that 
George Washington and Ben Franklin supported the Constitution.193 
 
 186. RAKOVE, supra note 185, at 135 (describing how “a predominantly Federalist 
press” promoted ratification). 
 187. Id. at 146. 
 188. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 
486 (1969). 
 189. Id. at 486–87. On the widespread support for ratification among merchants 
and others engaged in interstate and international commerce, see the 
groundbreaking quantitative analysis of ROBERT A. MCGUIRE, TO FORM A MORE 
PERFECT UNION: A NEW ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 142 (2002). “Delegates with merchant interests . . . were more likely to 
have voted to ratify the Constitution than were others.” Id. 
 190. FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 423. 
 191. WOOD, supra note 188, at 486–87 (explaining how “editors ‘afraid to offend the great 
men, or Merchants who could work their ruin,’ closed their columns to the opposition”). 
 192. JOHN K. ALEXANDER, THE SELLING OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION: A 
HISTORY OF NEWS COVERAGE 202 (1990) (“[N]ews media coverage of the convention 
essentially belonged to those who came to be called Federalists. . . . There is no effective 
way to assess the degree to which people were moved or possibly even controlled by the 
news media. Nevertheless . . . much of the coverage of the convention had been artfully 
calculated to prepare the minds of the people to receive any form of government the 
delegates offered.”); RAKOVE, supra note 185, at 146 (“But even taking these disadvantages 
into account, it seems doubtful that the course of public debate hinged on an imbalance 
in the dissemination of information and opinion.”). 
 193. RAKOVE, supra note 185, at 135 (“Appeals to the collective stature of the 
Convention and the prestige of Washington and Franklin thus formed an important 
element of Federalist strategy.”); see also id. at 136 (“All doubts should vanish simply because 
the two greatest Americans of their age had joined in framing the Constitution.”). 
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As America’s “only two national heroes” in the 1780s, Washington 
and Franklin commanded extraordinary influence with the public.194 
Indeed, Alexander Hamilton later asserted that the decisive factor in 
the Constitution’s ratification was the “very great weight of influence 
of the persons who framed it, particularly in the universal popularity 
of General Washington.”195 Likewise, Madison observed, “[h]ad the 
Constitution been framed & recommended by an obscure individual, 
instead of the body possessing public respect & confidence, there can 
not be a doubt, that altho’ it would have stood in the identical words, 
it would have commanded little attention from those who now 
admire its wisdom.”196 
In the end, no amount of Anti-Federalist arguments could overcome the 
fact that the most respected leaders in America sided with the Federalists. 
But it took a concerted campaign of editorials, pamphlets, and 
handbills to inform the public that Washington and Franklin supported 
ratification.197 The Federalists’ access to a broad network of sympathetic 
newspapers, publishers, and pamphleteers made sure that the public was 
repeatedly reminded of the crucial fact that Washington and Franklin 
backed the Constitution.198 
The key point is simply that money influenced the outcome of the 
ratification debate. It was expensive to communicate a political message, 
even in 1787. From the very beginning of American politics, therefore, 
Madison, Hamilton, and the Constitution’s other framers understood 
that money was essential to disseminating political speech. Indeed, 
without it, the Constitution might never have been ratified in the first 
place. It is also noteworthy that the contending parties did not have a 
level financial playing field. The Federalists’ financial resources gave 
them a clear advantage in the communications battle. Under the logic 
of Austin, therefore, the Federalists had “an unfair advantage in the 
 
 194. ROSSITER, supra note 185, at 278. 
 195. RAKOVE, supra note 185, at 135. 
 196. Id. at 139. 
 197. ROSSITER, supra note 185, at 278 (observing that “this elite—or series of 
elites—did as effective a job of arguing and manipulating as could have been done in 
those days of slow-paced communications and primitive organization” and noting 
“the Federalist argument that what was good enough for Washington and Franklin 
should be good enough for every American.”). 
 198. RAKOVE, supra note 185, at 135–36; ROSSITER, supra note 185, at 279 (“In the 
end, the Federalist won this war because they numbered among their leaders an 
overpowering majority of the word-makers—preachers, teachers, pamphleteers, 
editors, and lawyers—of republican America.”). 
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political marketplace” because they used their superior “resources 
amassed in the economic marketplace.”199 But under the approach laid 
out by the Court in Citizens United, the Federalist communications 
advantage would not be subject to government regulation because the 
government does not have a constitutionally permissible interest “in 
equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the 
outcome of elections.”200 The Citizens United ruling is thus far more 
consistent with the practices of those who supported the Constitution’s 
ratification than Austin’s antidistortion rationale. 
Most important of all, Madison and Hamilton put the lessons they 
learned in the ratification battle to practical use in the momentous 
political struggles of the 1790s. After the Constitution’s ratification in 
1788, a new ideological schism developed.201 A rapidly intensifying 
partisan divide pitted President Washington, Vice President Adams, and 
Treasury Secretary Hamilton on one side against Secretary of State 
Jefferson and Congressman Madison on the other.202 The dispute 
concerned the economic policies of the new nation. As head of the 
Treasury Department, Hamilton had centralized federal power through 
the establishment of a national bank, the federal assumption of state 
government debts, the industrialization of the American economy, and 
the promotion of a strong federal union.203 In the process, the 
Hamiltonian program concentrated power in urban areas, especially in 
the North, a consolidation that threatened to reduce the influence of 
rural areas, especially in the South.204 
 
 199. See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659 (1990). 
 200. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 350 (2010) (quoting Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976) (per curiam)). 
 201. WILENTZ, supra note 107, at 43, 45. 
 202. CHERNOW, supra note 165, at 392, 395 (“On issue after issue, ranging from 
redemption of war debt to creating a national bank, Washington had sided with 
Hamilton against Jefferson and Madison.”); DREW R. MCCOY, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC: 
POLITICAL ECONOMY IN JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA 136 (1980); FORREST MCDONALD, THE 
PRESIDENCY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 17–18 (1987). 
 203. LANCE BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION: EVOLUTION OF A PARTY 
IDEOLOGY 128, 129 (1978) (“Hamilton’s ideal was a great republic, and his model for 
greatness was Britain. He realized that Britain’s strength rested on commerce, 
manufacturing, a sound currency, and the world’s best system of public finance. He 
meant to make America a match.”); MCCOY, supra note 202, at 134. 
 204. Id. at 153–54; see also WILENTZ, supra note 107, at 46 (“The early congressional 
clashes over Hamilton’s policies had a strong sectional character, pitting the North 
against the South.”). 
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Hamilton’s policies horrified Madison and Jefferson, Virginians 
born and bred in the state’s agricultural heartland.205 Although 
Madison sided with Hamilton during the ratification debate, he 
feared that Hamilton’s financial policies would corrupt the new 
nation’s republican virtues.206 Madison thus joined with Jefferson to 
preserve America’s agrarian nature and resist the concentration of 
financial power in northeastern cities.207 
But Jefferson and Madison had no hope of stopping Hamilton 
unless they could win elections. President Washington sided with 
Hamilton, which meant that Jefferson and Madison had minimal 
influence within the Administration.208 In order to block Hamilton, 
therefore, they would have to build a political base outside the 
Washington Administration. To that end, they abandoned their long-
standing misgivings about political parties and started a partisan 
faction of their own, which they called the “Republicans” to 
distinguish it from Hamilton’s Federalist faction.209 Even before 
George Washington’s first term as president had ended, a full-blown 
war for public opinion erupted between the Federalists and 
Republicans. Both sides poured money—including, remarkably, 
money from government sources—to any newspaper editor willing to 
promote the Federalist or Republican party lines.210 
 
 205. BANNING, supra note 203, at 154; CHERNOW, supra note 165, at 391; MCCOY, 
supra note 202, at 153–55; WILENTZ, supra note 107, at 42, 44–49. 
 206. BANNING, supra note 203, at 154 (“Only after the completion of Hamilton’s 
economic program did Jefferson and Madison turn explicitly and systematically to 
the charges of conspiracy and corruption that others had occasionally suggested in 
Congress and the press.”). 
 207. Id. at 154, 300. 
 208. CHERNOW, supra note 165, at 395. 
 209. KETCHAM, supra note 156, at 119 (“He even joined Jefferson in founding an 
antiministerial, republican party, which each conceived as ‘a party to end all parties,’ 
that is, an instrument, a temporary means to overcome the power of party (inherently 
malignant) so skillfully mustered by Hamilton.”). 
 210. Herbert E. Alexander, Financing Presidential Campaigns, in 4 HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS: 1789–1968, at 3870 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. ed., 1971) (“The 
system of a newspaper supporting, and being supported by, one political faction or the 
other—and often supplemented with government printing subsidies—quickly developed. 
Editors’ fortunes rose and fell with the political success of their patrons. Newspapers 
vilified candidates mercilessly, and various factions spun off their own papers.”); CULVER 
H. SMITH, THE PRESS, POLITICS, AND PATRONAGE: THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT’S USE OF 
NEWSPAPERS, 1789–1875, at 13 (1977) (“Certain papers, published in the capital, came to 
be regarded as the personal organs of Hamilton and Jefferson, giving authoritative 
expression to the questions at issue between them.”). 
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The first editor to join the fray was John Fenno, owner of the Gazette of 
the United States.211 Hamilton persuaded Fenno to establish the newspaper 
in 1789.212 The Gazette immediately became the preeminent vehicle for 
Federalist propaganda. Fenno’s newspaper attacked President 
Washington’s critics, advocated on behalf of the Administration’s 
controversial financial program, and described Hamilton in “adoring” 
terms.213 In defending the Washington Administration, the Gazette 
published anonymous articles, including some written by Hamilton 
himself.214 But Fenno’s support did not come for free. To keep the 
Gazette afloat, the Federalists directed private and public money to the 
newspaper and its owner. The Federalist-controlled Senate awarded 
Fenno government printing contracts and Secretary Hamilton granted 
him the Treasury Department’s printing contracts.215 Fenno made no 
secret of his special business relationship with the government. He 
added to the Gazette’s masthead the words “By Authority,” brazenly 
signaling his semi-official status in the Washington Administration.216 But 
Fenno always seemed to need more money. At one point, he even issued 
an appeal to “the wealthy part of the community”—a core Federalist 
constituency—for financial assistance.217 Keenly aware of the newspaper’s 
political potency, Hamilton raised money on the paper’s behalf and 
personally loaned $2000 to Fenno to keep the Gazette in business.218 As the 
historian Culver Smith has observed, “the paper was too valuable to 
Hamilton and the Federalists to let it die.”219 
The effectiveness of the Federalist propaganda campaign convinced 
Jefferson and Madison that they had to fight fire with fire.220 Like 
Hamilton, they understood that money was essential to communicating 
their political message effectively. Accordingly, Jefferson hired the 
 
 211. WILLIAM J. SMALL, POLITICAL POWER AND THE PRESS 48 (1972); SMITH, supra 
note 210, at 13. 
 212. CHERNOW, supra note 165, at 395. 
 213. Id.; SMALL, supra note 211, at 48; SMITH, supra note 210, at 14. 
 214. SMALL, supra note 211, at 51 (Hamilton “privately wrote for . . . the Gazette of 
the United States”); SMITH, supra note 210, at 14. 
 215. SMALL, supra note 211, at 49. 
 216. SMITH, supra note 210, at 13. In fact, Fenno appeared in a directory of 
government officers in 1791. CHERNOW, supra note 165, at 395. 
 217. SMITH, supra note 210, at 14. 
 218. See CHERNOW, supra note 165, at 395; SMITH, supra note 210, at 14. 
 219. SMITH, supra note 210, at 14. 
 220. WILENTZ, supra note 107, at 49. 
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talented editor Philip Freneau as a Republican propagandist.221 To 
secure Freneau’s services, Jefferson gave him a job as a government 
translator, a position that paid $250 a year and involved no actual 
responsibilities.222 To sweeten the offer, Madison promised Freneau that 
he would receive all of the State Department’s printing contracts, as long 
as Freneau advocated for the Republican cause.223 
Madison and Jefferson’s financial inducements worked. Freneau 
founded the National Gazette, which immediately became the principal 
communication vehicle for advancing Jefferson and Madison’s political 
agenda.224 The newspaper made no pretense of objectivity.225 It sometimes 
made wild allegations, including once claiming that Hamilton’s financial 
plan had diverted $50 million in public funds to wealthy special interests.226 
Many of the attacks came from the pens of Madison and Jefferson 
themselves, who both wrote unsigned articles for the National Gazette.227 
The National Gazette’s attacks infuriated Hamilton and Washington. In 
an anonymous public letter, Hamilton revealed that Jefferson had used 
government funds to finance Freneau’s partisan attacks on the 
Federalists.228 Sarcastically, Hamilton called Jefferson’s use of 
government money for partisan purposes “an experiment somewhat 
new in the history of political manoevres in this country.”229 But it was a 
questionable line of attack because Hamilton had used government 
funds to pay John Fenno, the Federalist publicist. Accordingly, Freneau 
replied to Hamilton’s letter by pointing out that the Federalists had 
rewarded “the immaculate Mr. John Fenno” with a government contract 
worth $2000 a year.230 One can only wonder what the electorate thought 
of the revelation that the Federalists and Republicans had used 
government funds to finance their partisan propaganda campaigns. 
 
 221. SMALL, supra note 211, at 48. 
 222. Id. at 48–49. As Jefferson explained, “[t]he clerkship for foreign languages in my 
office is vacant; the salary, indeed, is very low, being two hundred and fifty dollars a year; 
but it also gives so little to do as not to interfere with any other office one may choose.” Id. 
 223. See SMITH, supra note 210, at 15. 
 224. SMALL, supra note 211, at 49; WILENTZ, supra note 107, at 49–50. 
 225. CHERNOW, supra note 165, at 396 (“Like other newspapers of the 1790s, 
Freneau’s National Gazette did not feign neutrality.”). 
 226. See SMITH, supra note 210, at 16. 
 227. See SMALL, supra note 211, at 50. See generally ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 
164, at 266–70 (noting Madison began writing for the paper only three weeks after it 
was established). 
 228. SMITH, supra note 210, at 16. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 17. 
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The partisan press war appalled President Washington. He described 
the National Gazette’s editorials as “outrages of common decency.”231 
But the President’s efforts to silence the newspaper failed. When 
Washington ordered Jefferson to fire Freneau from his government 
position, Jefferson refused, asserting that Freneau’s “paper has saved 
our constitution which was galloping fast into monarchy.”232 By the end 
of his presidency, newspapers had become such vicious vehicles of 
partisan attacks that Washington stopped reading them altogether, 
confining himself to reading advertisements because he believed they 
were “the only truths we can rely on in a newspaper.”233 
Madison possessed an equally skeptical view of the supposed 
neutrality and objectivity of the press. His perspective anticipated key 
aspects of Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion. In Citizens United, the 
Supreme Court warned that a ban on corporate speech “would 
produce the dangerous, and unacceptable, consequence that 
Congress could ban political speech of media corporations.”234 
Although the dissent claimed that a special constitutional protection 
might be extended to protect media corporations,235 Justice Kennedy 
found no reasonable grounds to distinguish media corporations from 
ordinary business corporations.236 As Kennedy explained: 
So even assuming the most doubtful proposition that a news organization 
has a right to speak when others do not, the exemption would allow a 
conglomerate that owns both a media business and an unrelated business 
to influence or control the media in order to advance its overall business 
interest. At the same time, some other corporation, with an identical 
business interest but no media outlet in its ownership structure, would be 
forbidden to speak or inform the public about the same issue. This 
differential treatment cannot be squared with the First Amendment.237 
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Likewise, James Madison ridiculed the idea that news organizations 
occupied a more elevated and objective perspective than other 
business ventures. Indeed, Madison believed that business 
considerations inevitably shaped newspapers’ coverage of public 
affairs just as they did any other revenue-generating enterprise. He 
observed that although newspapers ostensibly stood as the “guardian 
of public rights” and the “organ of necessary truths,” the reality as he 
saw it was that newspapers took pains not to offend advertisers.238 
Newspapers, he complained, found themselves in “prostration to 
advertising customers.”239 Since merchants and other commercial 
interests represented a disproportionately large share of their 
advertisers, newspapers in Madison’s time period took a pro-British 
and protrade position.240 Accordingly, Madison concluded that the 
press was “tainted with partiality.”241 The notion of an independent, 
neutral press corps free of business considerations thus struck 
Madison as absurd, just as it did Justice Kennedy in Citizens United. 
In addition to using government funds to establish partisan 
newspapers, Madison and Jefferson turned to wealthy individuals to 
bankroll their new party. One of their most important financial 
backers was the wealthy Philadelphia merchant John Swanwick, who 
used his personal fortune to finance Republican campaigns in 
Pennsylvania in the 1790s.242 In 1794 Swanwick’s campaign war chest 
enabled him to win a congressional seat of his own in Philadelphia, 
which previously had been a Federalist stronghold.243 Swanwick’s use 
of his personal fortune to win elections did not trouble James 
Madison. Quite the reverse. Madison celebrated Swanwick’s victory, 
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describing it as “of material consequence” because it occurred in the 
country’s commercial and political capital.244 In Congress, Swanwick 
would continue to put his fortune at the disposal of Republican causes, 
organizing public rallies and printing petitions and handbills that 
advocated Republican policies.245 Throughout, he maintained a close 
personal relationship with Madison, even securing a rental home in 
Philadelphia for Madison and his wife, Dolley.246 
When Washington announced he would not run for a third term in 
1796, the rivalry between the Federalists and the Republicans gave rise to 
the first contested presidential election in American history. The 1796 
election pitted Jefferson against Vice President Adams in a campaign 
that both sides viewed as a battle for the republic’s survival.247 Adams and 
the incumbent Federalist Party ultimately won the election, but the 
Republicans employed innovative campaign tactics that ushered in a 
new—and much more expensive—era of American politics. The most 
important innovations came from Madison’s close political ally, John 
Beckley, who developed a mass distribution system for Republican 
political literature.248 Madison and Jefferson placed great value on 
Beckley’s skills.249 As the historian Noble Cunningham has observed, 
Beckley was “a mysterious sort of person” who “worked behind the scenes” 
where he “displayed much skill in the realm of practical politics” and 
“knew how to win elections.”250 In Pennsylvania alone Beckley distributed 
30,000 tickets, which helped voters write Republican candidates and 
electors on their ballots.251 He also printed and circulated copies of 
Republican campaign speeches.252 The cost of Beckley’s electioneering 
tactics is unknown, but printing came at a high cost, as Hamilton and 
Madison had discovered a decade before with the Federalist Papers. 
One key lesson that Jefferson and Madison took from the 1796 
election was the importance of marshalling campaign funds. In a letter 
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to Madison in February 1799, Jefferson urged that no expense be spared 
by Republicans in the 1800 election, which pitted Jefferson against 
Adams in a rematch of the 1796 race.253 Republicans, Jefferson wrote, 
must engage in “systematic energies and sacrifices. The engine is the 
press. Every man must lay his purse and his pen under contribution.”254 
Jefferson practiced what he preached, contributing his own “purse” 
to the Republican press effort.255 For example, he paid James 
Callender, a newspaper writer, to launch vicious attacks on President 
Adams in the Richmond Examiner.256 After the election, Jefferson 
privately acknowledged his covert financial role in the campaign: “I as 
well as most other republicans who were in the way of doing it, 
contributed what I could to the support of the republican papers and 
printers, paid sums of money for the Bee, the Albany Register, etc.”257 
In addition to funding newspapers, Jefferson paid for the circulation 
of Republican campaign pamphlets.258 
Interestingly, Madison does not seem to have joined Jefferson in 
investing his own funds in the Republican effort. The historian 
Robert Allen Rutland has estimated that during Madison’s long career 
in elective office his “total campaign expenses could not have 
exceeded one hundred dollars.”259 Madison was content to let others 
finance his campaigns for him, and there was no shortage of volunteers 
among wealthy Republican supporters. As Jefferson had urged, 
Republicans spared no expense in establishing partisan newspapers 
across the country in 1799 and 1800.260 Federalists and Republicans 
alike viewed party-controlled newspapers “as a most important 
instrument for influencing the electorate.”261 In addition to 
establishing partisan newspapers, both parties distributed vast 
numbers of pamphlets and handbills to sway public opinion.262 
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The Republicans proved far more adept at campaigning than their 
Federalists opponents.263 Not coincidentally, the Republicans prevailed 
in the election, a victory that led to the first transfer of power from one 
party to another in American history.264 The Federalist defeat in 1800 
resulted at least in part from the party’s failure to adapt to a changing 
political landscape. The Republican tactic of inundating the voting 
public with campaign literature astounded the Federalists.265 Many 
Federalists believed campaigning was beneath the dignity of elected 
officials as it led to “loud and so indecently rude” public displays on 
election day.266 They found particularly appalling the Republican 
innovation of sending candidates and orators on the campaign trail to 
communicate directly with the electorate.267 According to the 
Federalists, Republicans made campaign speeches that were “foolish and 
inflammatory” and “fraught with all the falsehood imaginable—solely 
with a view to affect our election.”268 They also decried the Republicans’ 
distribution of printed tickets, which Federalists saw as a form of 
cheating because it assisted voters in writing Republican candidates 
and electors on their ballots.269 
Republican tactics may have made elections more noisy, 
competitive, and boisterous, but they also had the crucial advantage 
that they worked.270 John Beckley once again employed his 
electioneering genius to bombard voters with campaign literature.271 
In one of his many groundbreaking techniques, he wrote a campaign 
biography of Thomas Jefferson and then arranged for 5000 copies of 
it to be printed and distributed in multiple states.272 In many other 
ways, Republicans used money to get their message out to voters. 
Some Republican leaders paid for pamphlets attacking John 
Adams.273 Others used more indirect but equally effective methods. 
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For example, at a time when the incumbent Federalists controlled the 
printing contracts of the presidential and congressional branches, 
Republican legislatures gave lucrative state printing contracts to 
newspapers that would support Republican candidates.274 The Republican 
campaign tactics represented a systematic effort to communicate with the 
national electorate. As Noble Cunningham has explained: 
In their attention to party organization and machinery, the 
Republicans remained constantly aware of the necessity of 
maintaining popular support. Party spokesmen therefore exploited 
every available agency of mass communication: official papers such 
as petitions against governmental measures, public circular letters 
from congressmen to their constituents, newspapers, pamphlets, 
handbills, private letters which circulated among leading figures, 
and personal contacts and word-of-mouth communications.275 
The volume of campaign literature sometimes overwhelmed voters.276 
As a South Carolina observer complained, “[w]e are so beset and run 
down by Federal republicans and their pamphlets that I begin to think 
for the first time that there is rottenness in the system they attempt to 
support, or why all this violent electioneering?”277 
But it worked. After the election, the Federalist leader Fisher Ames 
admitted that the Republicans’ “unceasing use” of partisan newspapers 
helped make Jefferson’s victory possible.278 The Federalists’ comparatively 
restrained approach to campaigning had no chance of succeeding against 
aggressive Republican campaign tactics. It would never again be viewed as 
“improper” for candidates and parties to “campaign for election.”279 
Jefferson’s victory in 1800 thus represented a turning point in campaign 
tactics. In 1790, candidates had relied on their own personal assets and 
conducted minimalist campaigns of modest scale.280 But, by the end of the 
decade, the nature of American election campaigns had radically 
changed.281 The “detestable practice of electioneering” was here to stay.282 
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The crucial question, of course, is where did the Republican money 
come from? There was no Federal Election Commission and no public 
reporting of campaign expenditures in 1800.283 Thus, we will never know 
who paid for Beckley’s 5000 campaign biographies of Jefferson, nor how 
many wealthy individuals the Republicans relied on to finance their 
political communications. What we do know is that Jefferson, Madison, 
and the other figures of the day went out of their way to avoid disclosing 
how they financed their election campaigns. For example, Jefferson 
urged that Madison take pains to keep his role in the political writing 
campaign “sacredly secret.”284 Likewise, Jefferson hid his own role in the 
Republicans’ expensive communications strategy.285 “Do not let my 
name be connected with the business” of distributing pro-Republican 
political pamphlets, he instructed James Monroe in February 1799.286 
Other politicians in the early national period maintained a similar level 
of secrecy. For example, on behalf of Aaron Burr’s gubernatorial 
campaign, New York Congressman Peter Van Gaasbeck paid for a rally 
in Kingston, New York.287 But Gaasbeck instructed his allies not to 
disclose the source of the funds. “When you go to Kingston,” Gaasbeck 
wrote one of the rally’s organizers, “assure our Friends that every 
expense they are at will be cordially refunded from him who is not to be 
seen in that act; now my worthy fellow put the wheel in Motion.”288 
It seems virtually certain that wealthy and politically connected 
individuals bore the vast majority of campaign costs in the early national 
period. Few ordinary Americans had disposable income to spend on 
contributing to an election campaign. Indeed, as Noble Cunningham 
noted, the rise of the Republican Party organization did not come from 
the “grass roots.”289 Instead, wealthy candidates like Thomas Jefferson 
and James Madison, powerful party leaders like John Beckley, and 
business figures with a financial interest in the outcome of elections 
drove the creation of the innovative—and expensive—Republican 
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tactics of 1800, such as buying control of newspapers, distributing 
campaign literature, and holding election rallies.290 
The bottom line, therefore, is that James Madison’s political career 
illustrated the distinction between republican theories of political 
purity on the one hand, and the inescapable reality on the other that 
communicating with voters costs money. Madison began his political 
career in 1777 with a surprising defeat because he renounced the role of 
money in politics. He spent the rest of his career relying on well-to-do 
allies to fund his political activities, an effort that would culminate in two 
presidential terms of his own. None of his success would have been 
possible without financial backers who funded his and his party’s 
political communications. Although young Madison had a fairly 
puritanical view of the role of money in politics, there is no evidence 
that he felt guilty about his campaign tactics later in life. He certainly left 
no indication that he thought relying on wealthy donors to fund his 
party’s political activities rendered his party corrupt. 
IV.    MADISON’S BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE RIGHT OF               
FREE SPEECH 
In the spring of 1789, Congressman Madison proposed amending the 
Constitution by adding a bill of rights.291 His views on the subject had 
changed over time. At the Virginia ratification convention the year before, 
Madison had argued that “no bill of rights was necessary because ‘all 
powers not given are reserved.’”292 Even after he began work on the Bill of 
Rights, the right of free speech did not command much of Madison’s 
thinking.293 In the late 1780s and early 1790s, the issue of religious 
freedom loomed much larger in his mind than the issue of free speech.294 
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At the time that Madison wrote the First Amendment, it was not 
even clear what “freedom of speech” and “freedom of the press” really 
meant. As the scholar Eugene Volokh has explained, the phrase 
“freedom of the press” referred to the technology of printing and 
publishing, and not to any special constitutional protection for 
newspapers, editors, or journalists.295 Moreover, many Americans in the 
1790s believed that the right of free expression only protected against 
prior restraint, not post-publication punishment of speech.296 As the 
revolutionary pamphleteer Thomas Paine observed, “the term liberty of 
the press . . . refers to the fact of printing free from prior restraint . . . .”297 The 
Federalist Party, in particular, took a restrictive view of the right of free 
expression.298 Federalists controlled the White House and Congress 
throughout the 1790s, and they proved quite willing to punish their 
political opponents for speech critical of the incumbent party.299 
The political battles of the 1790s brought the issue of freedom of 
expression to the forefront of Madison’s thinking. In 1791—the same 
year the First Amendment was adopted—Madison and Jefferson 
began their propaganda war against the Federalists by enlisting the 
services of Philip Freneau and his National Gazette.300 Madison saw the 
Republican press as essential for combating Hamilton’s ideas and for 
advancing the Jeffersonian political agenda.301 The struggle against 
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Hamilton thus taught Madison the importance of a robust, highly 
partisan opposition press. Writing in December 1791 in the National 
Gazette, Madison emphasized the importance of a “general intercourse of 
sentiments.”302 To that end, he advocated a “free press, and particularly a 
circulation of newspapers through the entire body of the people.”303 
Crucially, of course, Madison did not mean a free press in the 
modern sense of a neutral, detached corps of professional editors 
and writers committed to journalistic objectivity. No newspaper met 
that definition in the 1790s.304 As the historian Ron Chernow has 
observed, newspapers in the 1790s “were unabashedly partisan organs 
that supplied much of the adhesive power binding the incipient 
parties together.”305 Newspapers did little in the way of reporting facts 
and instead focused on offering partisan opinions on the issues of the 
day.306 During the early national period, therefore, newspapers “more 
closely resembled journals of opinion than daily newspapers.”307 
Indeed, Madison used the National Gazette to launch “anonymous 
blasts against Hamilton,” including falsely insinuating that Hamilton 
was personally corrupt and was conspiring against the United States 
with its British enemies.308 To Madison, the phrase “freedom of the 
press” meant the freedom to print vicious—and, depending on one’s 
point of view, false—partisan attacks on the party in power. The 
printing press thus offered Madison and Jefferson a crucial vehicle 
for communicating with the electorate. 
Madison’s broad conception of the right of free expression clashed 
with the Federalist efforts to silence their critics. The Federalist 
campaign of political repression prompted Madison to take a broad 
view of the First Amendment, one that was highly protective of the 
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right to free speech. The first flash point between the Madisonian 
and Federalist views of political speech arose when dozens of anti-
Federalist clubs known as Democratic-Republican Societies took root 
across the country in the early 1790s.309 Inspired by Freneau’s 
National Gazette as well as by revolutionary groups in France, the 
Democratic-Republican Societies both galvanized and organized the 
Washington Administration’s critics.310 As the historian Matthew 
Schoenbachler has explained, the societies served “as the first media of 
organized popular political dissent in the new republic.”311 In pamphlets 
and handbills, the societies opposed Hamilton’s financial program, 
criticized President Washington’s concentration of executive power, and 
condemned the social elitism of the Federalists in general.312 The societies 
even accused the Federalists of subverting American liberty, going so far as 
to accuse Washington and Hamilton of seeking to install in America “the 
corrupt policy of trans-Atlantic monarchy and aristocracy.”313 
Ironically, the leaders of the Democratic-Republican Societies 
tended to be fairly wealthy themselves, at least by the standards of the 
1790s.314 The officers of the clubs typically consisted of merchants, 
lawyers, slaveowners, professionals, and skilled artisans, a group that 
exercised considerable economic power in their own right.315 The relative 
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prosperity of the societies’ leaders enabled them to pay for printing and 
circulating handbills and political tracts. But the leaders generally came 
from the ranks of the upwardly mobile, and thus often found themselves 
socially excluded from the Federalists’ old money circles.316 
The ferocity of the societies’ public accusations alarmed the 
Federalists.317 The Federalists viewed the societies as an example of 
“democratic excess” and believed that opposition to the 
Administration’s policies should be confined to the ballot box and 
not expressed in public criticism.318 Accordingly, many Federalists 
challenged the “very idea of organized popular criticism” of the 
Washington Administration.319 The Federalists simply did not believe 
that the societies’ public critique of the government represented a 
legitimate form of political discourse.320 
The controversy over the societies anticipated a growing Federalist 
hostility to opposition speech. The Federalists particularly objected to 
the fact that the societies’ alliance with Republican newspaper editors 
enabled the societies to reach a wide audience, which the Federalists 
claimed made the societies disproportionately and unfairly influential 
with the public.321 Whereas the societies viewed their activities as “an 
emphatic affirmation of the popular right to unrestricted speech and 
association,” the Federalists viewed them as having too prominent of 
a place on the public stage.322 The Federalist critique of the Democratic-
Republican Societies bore more than a passing resemblance to the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Austin two centuries later.323 In upholding 
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Michigan’s ban on corporate independent expenditures, the Supreme 
Court asserted that the government could impose regulations designed 
to ensure that “expenditures reflect actual public support for the 
political ideas espoused by corporations.”324 Likewise, the Federalists 
insisted that editorials in the Republican newspapers did not reflect 
actual public support for the positions the Republicans espoused, and 
thus should be suppressed.325 
When John Adams became president in 1797, his Administration 
took a confrontational approach to the Republican newspapers. His 
wife, Abigail Adams, supported a crackdown on the “wicked and 
base” criticism emanating from the “vile incendiaries” of the 
Republican press.326 Federalist animosity toward Republican 
newspapers became increasingly aggressive. In one case, a Federalist 
mob attacked the building that housed the Philadelphia Aurora, a 
Republican newspaper edited by Benjamin Franklin’s grandson, 
Benjamin Franklin Bache.327 Abigail Adams had no sympathy for 
Bache, complaining that in “any other country, Bache and all his 
papers would have been seized long ago.”328 When the twenty-nine-
year-old Bache died shortly thereafter of yellow fever, President 
Adams condemned the young man posthumously as a “malicious 
libeller.”329 The President took satisfaction from the fact that “the 
yellow fever arrested him in his detestable career.”330 
When the United States entered into an undeclared naval war 
against France in 1798, the Federalists used the crisis as a pretext to 
silence their Republican opponents once and for all.331 In July 1798, 
Congress passed the Sedition Act,332 which criminalized “any false, 
scandalous, and malicious” statement about federal officeholders or 
any statement intended to “excite against them . . . the hatred of the 
good people of the United States.”333 The Sedition Act represented a 
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direct attack on press freedom and the right to criticize the 
government. One member of the Federalist majority in Congress 
freely admitted that the new law was intended to ensure that 
American newspapers would only publish “pure sentiments and good 
principles,” i.e., Federalist principles.334 The bottom line was the 
Federalists did not believe in the value of a free, full, and open public 
discourse. As the President’s personal secretary explained, “the 
liberty of the press . . . is a powerful engine for the subversion of all 
government—a mighty lever, sufficient . . . to overthrow the social 
order of the world.”335 To underscore the stakes as the Federalists saw 
them, President Adams signed the Sedition bill into law on July 14, 
1798, the ninth anniversary of the storming of the Bastille, the 
uprising that triggered the French Revolution.336 
The Federalists soon made good on their threats.337 They pursued 
criminal cases for seditious libel against editors of five of the six most 
important Republican newspapers.338 The power of criminal 
prosecutions became a campaign weapon for Federalists to wield in 
the presidential election.339 Under the Sedition Act, Federalist 
prosecutors brought criminal charges against Republican editors in 
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and New York, all states that the parties 
viewed as crucial to the outcome of the 1800 election.340 With good 
reason, Madison and Jefferson feared that under the pretense of 
suppressing seditious libel the Federalists would destroy the 
Republican Party.341 Alarmed by the rising threat of repression, 
Jefferson warned Madison that “[i]f these papers fall, . . . 
Republicanism will be entirely browbeaten.”342 Indeed, as the 
historians Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick observed, “the freedom 
of the Republican press to pass judgment on officeholders—openly, 
aggressively, even abusively—was essential to the party’s survival.”343 
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Even members of Congress were not safe from the Federalist 
onslaught. In one of the most dramatic episodes of the Administration’s 
crackdown on dissent, Federalist prosecutors brought criminal charges 
under the Sedition Act against Republican Congressman Matthew Lyon 
of Vermont.344 The Federalists charged Lyon with committing sedition 
when the newspaper he owned accused President Adams of having an 
“unbounded thirst for ridiculous pomp, foolish adulation, and selfish 
avarice.”345 Lyon was convicted, fined $1000, and sentenced to four 
months in prison.346 But the Federalists’ intimidation tactics did not 
cow Lyon’s Republican supporters. He campaigned for re-election 
from his jail cell and won by the largest margin of his career.347 
The ballot box proved critical to ending the Sedition Act. The 
Republicans’ victories in the 1800 election brought the seditious libel 
prosecutions to an end. The Sedition Act expired on March 3, 1801, 
the day before Jefferson’s inauguration.348 President Jefferson 
ordered the release of those serving their sentences and pardoned a 
number of the editors convicted under the Act.349 Ironically, despite 
the Federalists’ efforts to silence them, Republican newspapers 
played a decisive role in the election’s outcome.350 As the historian 
Jeffrey Pasley observed, “In the aftermath of the 1800 election, 
Federalists and Republicans alike blamed or credited the nationwide 
network of Republican newspapers for Jefferson’s triumph.”351 
After Jefferson’s election, Republicans redoubled their efforts to 
build a partisan newspaper empire,352 creating in the process a 
political communications network that operated much like modern 
PACs. Party officials donated money to fund Republican newspapers 
and reported their progress to President Jefferson.353 Prior to the 
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1808 election, for example, Attorney General Levi Lincoln assured 
Jefferson that individual Republican leaders in Massachusetts had 
donated $50 to $100 each to establish and maintain a Republican 
paper in Worcester.354 Likewise, Republican supporters in Kentucky 
boasted to Senator John Breckinridge that “[a] small number of 
persons have united, and at a great expense, procured a new press 
and types, and hired, upon a liberal salary, an Editor and a 
Printer.”355 In what amounted to de facto campaign fundraising 
appeals, Republicans leaders urged supporters to provide financial 
support to their partisan newspapers.356 In 1808, a Republican 
circular in New York called on party members “to extend their 
patronage by liberal subscriptions and payments for papers. Let every 
Republican make it a matter of principle and honor to pay his printer 
when due, and it would greatly aid him in his resources.”357 
One tactic Republicans developed under Jefferson was to distribute 
their newspapers to voters for free.358 But the practice was ruinously 
expensive for the newspapers.359 Accordingly, Republican leaders 
implored their supporters to contribute money for the distribution of 
free newspapers.360 For example, during James Madison’s successful 
1808 campaign for president, a Massachusetts Republican newspaper 
editorial urged fellow Republicans to “unite in forming A PATRIOTIC 
FUND, to defray the charges of printing and distributing gratis, 
handbills, pamphlets, and other papers.”361 The newspaper editor noted 
that “[a] dollar a man from every one who could afford it, would be 
amply sufficient.”362 In addition, President Jefferson directed 
government printing contracts to Republican newspapers across the 
country.363 Jefferson also once again personally contributed to 
Republican newspapers, paying over $70 for fourteen subscriptions 
 
 354. Id. at 243. 
 355. Id. at 244. 
 356. Id. at 245. 
 357. Id. 
 358. Id. at 245–46. 
 359. Id. at 247. 
 360. Id. at 246. 
 361. Id. 
 362. Id. 
 363. See id. at 248–49 (“The policy of rewarding Republican printers with federal 
patronage . . . was followed by the administration. . . . Once inaugurated, the policy 
of supporting Republican presses with printing patronage appears to have been 
consistently applied throughout the Jeffersonian administration.”). 
1534 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:1485 
 
during the 1804 campaign.364 By the end of his presidency, he 
subscribed to thirty-three newspapers.365 He also subsidized Republican 
printers by paying generously for their political pamphlets.366 In one 
case, the President paid a New York Republican printer over $98 to print 
campaign pamphlets and partisan newspapers.367 In another case, he 
gave a Philadelphia Republican printer over $120 during the 1804 
election.368 Yet, Jefferson always maintained a low opinion of the 
information purveyed by newspapers. Writing privately in 1807, he 
observed, “[n]othing can now be believed which is seen in a 
newspaper. . . . [T]he man who never looks into a newspaper is better 
informed than he who reads them . . . .”369 
James Madison benefited from the partisan newspaper network 
and the sophisticated political organization that the Republicans had 
built in the early 1800s.370 Although a brilliant man, he was not a 
good campaigner and did not enjoy the campaign trail.371 A small, 
shy, and inconspicuous person, he struggled to connect with 
strangers and never became a particularly effective public speaker.372 
Madison was instead a party builder, working behind the scenes to 
organize Republicans into a powerful partisan organization.373 In the 
end, the Republican political communications network consisting of 
newspapers, pamphlets, handbills, and party rallies more than 
compensated for Madison’s personal shortcomings as a dull and 
uncharismatic candidate. As Noble Cunningham observed, by 1808 
Republicans had in place a system of “[e]ffective organization and 
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aggressive campaigning through newspapers, party literature, and 
personal contacts [that] directly aimed at winning and maintaining 
the support of the voter.”374 Thanks in no small part to the 
Republicans’ complex—and expensive—campaign organization, 
Madison won the presidency in 1808 and won reelection in 1812.375 
Madison thus keenly understood the importance of freedom of 
expression. The Adams Administration’s efforts to repress its opponents 
profoundly shaped Madison’s view of the First Amendment. By the late 
1790s, he believed that the First Amendment’s right of freedom of 
expression categorically denied Congress the authority to punish 
seditious libel.376 The Federalist claim that the First Amendment only 
protected against prior restraint struck Madison as absurd.377 As he 
explained, “It would seem a mockery that no law should be passed, 
preventing publications from being made, but that laws might be passed 
for punishing them in case they should be made.”378 Madison also 
warned that censorship undermined the principle of democratic 
elections because it suppressed “information and communication 
among the people, which is indispensable to the just exercise of their 
electoral rights.”379 The Federalist censorship campaign convinced 
Madison that a broader, more protective view of free speech was 
necessary.380 As the scholar Noah Feldman has explained, “it became 
clear [to Madison] that free speech would be necessary to keep 
public opinion informed,” as public opinion represented “the 
ultimate guarantor of liberty.”381 
Throughout his presidency, Madison remained true to his 
principles and never acted to suppress the Federalist press, even 
when doing so would have benefited him politically.382 In June 1812, 
 
 374. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 352, at 298. 
 375. See Irving Brant, Election of 1808, in 1 HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL 
CAMPAIGNS: 1789–1968, supra note 210, at 185–221; see also Norman K. Risjord, 
Election of 1812, in 1 HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS: 1789–1968 supra 
note 210, at 249–72. 
 376. FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 428. 
 377. Id. at 429. 
 378. Id. 
 379. Id. 
 380. Id. 
 381. Id. 
 382. See DREW R. MCCOY, THE LAST OF THE FATHERS: JAMES MADISON AND THE 
REPUBLICAN LEGACY 12 (1989) (finding that even in the face of rampant obstruction 
of his government’s policies and outright treason, Madison never abridged freedom 
of speech or press). 
1536 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:1485 
 
Congress declared war on Britain, a conflict that resulted from the Royal 
Navy’s harassment of American shipping.383 The War of 1812 soon 
escalated into a major conflict that lasted until February 1815.384 The war 
resulted in the deaths of several thousand people and cost the 
government over $158 million.385 Throughout the conflict, Madison’s 
opponents subjected him to ferocious attacks and actively worked to 
undermine his prosecution of the war.386 Federalist governors in New 
England even refused to provide military assistance to the war effort.387 
In August 1814, the British Army captured Washington D.C., forcing 
President Madison to flee the White House in a humiliating retreat.388 
Opposition to the war became so intense that in December 1814 
Federalist leaders from the New England states convened a regional 
conference in Hartford, Connecticut.389 Some observers feared the 
Hartford convention would ultimately lead to the secession of the New 
England states from the Union.390 
President Madison viewed the Federalist obstruction of his war policies 
as treasonous. In a letter to Jefferson, Madison wrote that “the seditious 
opposition in Massachusetts and Connecticut, with the intrigues elsewhere 
insidiously co-operating with it, have so clogged the wheels of the war that I 
fear the campaign will not accomplish the object of it.”391 A visitor to the 
White House found the President “miserably shattered and woe-begone” 
with “[h]is mind . . . full of the New England sedition.”392 In a private letter, 
Madison accused the antiwar Federalists of providing “inducement” to the 
British to persevere in the war.393 A Republican newspaper editor even 
warned the President that the antiwar Federalists threatened to provoke “all 
the horrors of civil war, anarchy, and probably terminate in despotism.”394 
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But Madison’s commitment to free expression never wavered. Despite 
“countless cases of outright treason” in New England, Madison refused 
to silence his enemies.395 As the historian Harry Coles observed of 
Madison, “Though the provocation was extreme, he never suggested 
measures abridging freedom of speech or press.”396 President Madison 
did not even take steps to prevent the Hartford convention from 
discussing disunion or advocating peace with Britain.397 As Noah 
Feldman has emphasized, “It is essentially impossible to imagine any 
subsequent wartime president—all of whom, without exception, 
engaged in at least some attempts to suppress opposition—allowing 
the Hartford convention to go forward.”398 
There is no regulatory interest more compelling for the government 
than national security. In Federalist No. 23, Alexander Hamilton 
identified the defense of the nation as the federal government’s foremost 
duty.399 The Supreme Court takes the same view. As the justices observed 
in a 1980 case, “[i]t is ‘obvious and unarguable’ that no governmental 
interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.”400 
But President Madison believed that the Constitutional right to 
free speech took precedence, even over the government’s compelling 
interest in national security. Accordingly, during the darkest days of 
the war when the capital itself fell into the hands of a foreign invader, 
Madison took no action to suppress the Federalists’ “treasonous” 
statements. In Citizens United, Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority 
that “[i]f the First Amendment has any force, it prohibits Congress 
from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for simply 
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engaging in political speech.”401 During the War of 1812, Madison’s 
tolerant approach to disloyal Federalists reflected precisely Kennedy’s 
view. The Sedition Act convinced Madison that the broadest possible 
protections should be extended to citizens engaged in political speech.402 
Even a foreign invasion did not shake his commitment to free speech. 
CONCLUSION 
As a young man, James Madison might have agreed with the critics 
of the Citizens United decision. His refusal to buy alcohol for voters in 
1777 reflected his Republican principles, which viewed the role of 
money in politics through a lens of distrust. But as a politician, he 
became a pragmatist and a realist.403 As Noah Feldman has put it, 
Madison learned that he had “to use the tools of politics to achieve” 
his ideals and principles.404 Above all, Madison recognized that to 
realize his policy goals, he had to persuade the public to support his 
partisan and political agenda.405 
The threat posed by corruption was not lost on James Madison. He 
feared the concentration of wealth that Hamilton’s financial 
programs would produce. But Madison did not attempt to ban or 
otherwise restrict the financial resources that Hamilton used to fund 
the Federalist Party’s political communications. Instead, Madison and 
Jefferson sought to defeat the Hamiltonian program at the ballot 
box. To that end, Madison joined with Jefferson in forming the 
Republican Party, which depended on the use of money to rally 
supporters and win over the electorate. Jefferson urged Republican 
leaders to make financial contributions to the partisan cause, and he 
and Madison welcomed the support of wealthy individuals like John 
Swanwick. The party Madison and Jefferson cofounded developed 
innovative electioneering tactics that dramatically increased the cost 
of campaigns. The phenomenon of soaring campaign costs thus 
began with James Madison himself. Yet, during his long career in 
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office, Madison gave no indication that he thought that campaign 
contributions or expenditures constituted a form of corruption that 
could be banned or restricted under the Constitution. 
Above all, Madison viewed the Constitutional right to free 
expression in sweeping terms. During the War of 1812, he feared that 
Federalist antiwar rhetoric threatened the survival of the United 
States. Nevertheless, despite the compelling national security interest in 
silencing disloyal Federalists, President Madison took a strongly pro-
speech position, even though it came at his own political detriment. 
Equally important, Madison did not believe that a principled distinction 
could be drawn between business speakers on the one hand, and media 
speakers on the other. His political experience taught him that 
ideological biases and business interests influenced every newspaper. 
Accordingly, his support for a broad and sweeping freedom of 
expression extended to all speakers, including politicians, business 
leaders, journalists, voters, and ordinary citizens alike. 
In his majority opinion in Citizens United, Justice Kennedy observed 
that “[s]peech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means 
to hold officials accountable to the people.”406 James Madison devoted his 
entire career to that principle. The fractious world of practical politics 
taught him that more political speech was better than less. 
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